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1893 
The English Fire Courts and 
the American Right to Civil Jury Trial 
Jay Tidmarsh† 
This Article uncovers the history of a long-forgotten English court system, the 
“fire courts,” which Parliament established to resolve disputes between landlords 
and tenants in urban areas destroyed in catastrophic fires. One of the fire courts’ 
remarkable features was the delegation of authority to judges to adjudicate disputes 
without juries. Because the Seventh Amendment’s right to a federal civil jury trial 
depends in part on the historical practice of English courts in 1791, this delegation 
bears directly on the present power of Congress to abrogate the use of juries in federal 
civil litigation. 
Parliament enacted fire-courts legislation on eight occasions between the mid-
seventeenth century and the nineteenth century. This Article particularly empha-
sizes the first and largest of these courts, established after the Great Fire of London 
in 1666. Archival research into 1,585 cases resolved by the London Fire Court re-
veals that the Fire Court never employed juries to resolve contested factual matters. 
This Article argues that the history of these courts provides a limited but clear power 
for Congress to strike the right to civil juries in federal court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In constitutional adjudication, history matters.1 Although 
agreement on this point is widespread, debates rage around two 
subsidiary questions: How much does history matter, and which 
history matters?2 “How much does history matter” concerns the 
weight that historical evidence should receive in relation to other 
interpretive or constructive guides such as the Constitution’s text, 
purpose, and structure; precedent; moral norms; and present-day 
political, social, and economic realities.3 Originalists, for instance, 
give history near-conclusive weight, at least for ambiguous con-
stitutional texts;4 but living constitutionalists are likely to value 
historical evidence less than modern realities in determining con-
stitutional boundaries.5 “Which history matters” encompasses 
issues of time frame (what is the relevant historical period?), 
scope (what evidence from this period is relevant?), and indetermi-
nacy (what happens when the relevant evidence from the relevant 
 
 1 See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 713 (1999) (interpreting the Eleventh 
Amendment in accordance with “the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the author-
itative interpretations by this Court”). See also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 
84 NYU L Rev 1, 21 (2009) (noting that the belief that “the original character of the U.S. 
Constitution . . . ‘matters’ or ‘is relevant’ to proper constitutional interpretation . . . [is] a 
trivial thesis without dissenters”); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive 
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Georgetown L J 1765, 1766 
(1997) (“[V]irtually all practitioners of and commentators on constitutional law accept that 
original meaning has some relevance to constitutional interpretation.”); H. Jefferson Pow-
ell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va L Rev 659, 695 (1987) (“Responsible, intellectually re-
spectable history in my opinion is an inextricable and essential element in our discussions 
of the Republic’s fundamental law.”). 
 2 Professor Darrell A.H. Miller has posed similar questions, trained specifically on 
the interpretations of the Second and Seventh Amendments. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, 
History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us about the Second, 
122 Yale L J 852, 876–86, 907–17 (2013) (positing three questions: “[w]hose history,” 
“[h]ow much history,” and “[w]hat [about] . . . conflicting or indeterminate history?”). 
 3 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 7–8 (Oxford 
1982) (describing “historical, textual, structural, prudential, and doctrinal” typologies of 
constitutional interpretation and construction); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 
113 Mich L Rev 179, 212–22 (2014) (discussing common-law constitutionalism, original-
ism, pragmatism, conventionalism, and normativity as methods of constitutional interpre-
tation). See also generally James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 
Fordham L Rev 1335 (1997) (arguing for a “moral reading” of the Constitution). 
 4 See Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the 
Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 Tex L Rev 147, 154 (2012) (stating that 
originalists agree that “the original meaning of each provision of the Constitution was 
fixed at the time of its framing and ratification” and that “original meaning should have 
binding or constraining force”). 
 5 See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 1 (Oxford 2010) (“A ‘living constitu-
tion’ is one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without 
being formally amended.”). 
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period is conflicting or absent?). For example, all originalists 
agree that the relevant time frame is the point of a constitutional 
provision’s ratification, but they diverge on the question of scope; 
“old originalists” limit the scope of historical inquiry to the evi-
dence of the drafters’ intent, while “new originalists” shift the in-
quiry to the evidence of the original public meaning.6 For living 
constitutionalists, the time frame expands to include the nation’s 
history subsequent to ratification, with the scope of the inquiry as 
broad as all past events that help to shape a constitutional provi-
sion for modern needs.7 
Almost uniquely among constitutional provisions, the Seventh 
Amendment’s guarantee of civil jury trial engenders few debates 
about weight, time frame, scope, or indeterminacy.8 On the issue 
of weight, the Supreme Court has broken the Seventh Amendment’s 
analysis into two principal components. The first is to determine 
whether the Amendment requires a jury to try a particular claim.9 
To answer this question, the Court turns to three factors: “first, 
 
 6 See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 Fordham L Rev 
411, 412–15 (2013) (comparing “old originalism” with “[n]ew [o]riginalism”). 
 7 Dorf, 85 Georgetown L J at 1811 (cited in note 1) (arguing that postenactment 
“historical events often inform constitutional interpretation more directly and in a way 
that reinforces” originalist modes of constitutional interpretation). 
 8 The Seventh Amendment provides in full: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
US Const Amend VII. The first clause guarantees the right to civil jury trial; the second 
clause, known as the Reexamination Clause, concerns matters beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
The Seventh Amendment is one of the few guarantees in the Bill of Rights that has 
not—or at least not yet—been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made 
applicable to the states. See González–Oyarzun v Caribbean City Builders, Inc, 798 F3d 
26, 29 (1st Cir 2015) (per curiam) (“The Supreme Court has consistently held that states 
are not constitutionally required to provide a jury trial in civil cases.”). Incorporation of 
the Seventh Amendment has never been a burning issue, because forty-eight states (Louisiana 
and Wyoming being the exceptions) have comparable jury trial guarantees in their consti-
tutions. See Robert Wilson, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Ap-
plication of the Pickering Test, 18 Geo Mason U CR L J 389, 401 & n 116 (2008). This 
Article examines only the scope of the jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment—in 
other words, in federal court. 
 9 See, for example, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No 391 v Terry, 494 
US 558, 561 (1990) (holding that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial of a claim 
that a union violated its duty of fair representation); Granfinanciera, SA v Nordberg, 492 
US 33, 36 (1989) (holding that a jury trial was required for a trustee’s claim that a debtor 
had fraudulently transferred money to a defendant who had not submitted a claim against 
the bankruptcy estate). 
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the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, 
the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limita-
tions of juries.”10 
 Today, the third factor is rarely in play.11 The first factor (the 
custom before the merger of law and equity) requires a historical 
inquiry. The second factor (the remedy sought) is historically in-
spired, given that damages were generally awarded at common 
law, which used juries, and injunctions were generally awarded 
in equity, which did not.12 
In weighing the pure historical inquiry of the first factor in 
relation to the rough-and-ready historical inquiry of the second 
factor, the Court has wobbled a bit over time. In 1990, in Chauf-
feurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No 391 v Terry,13 the Court 
identified the second factor as “more important in our analysis.”14 
More recent cases, however, suggest that the importance of the 
first factor’s pure historical inquiry is on the rise. In Feltner v 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc,15 which involved a claim by a 
copyright holder seeking jury trial on the issue of statutory dam-
ages, the Court stated that it would “examine both the nature of 
 
 10 Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531, 538 n 10 (1970). 
 11 Before Ross, the Court had used only the first two factors to decide if a claim was 
jury triable. See, for example, Parsons v Bedford, 28 US (3 Pet) 433, 446–47 (1830). Ross 
introduced the third “practical abilities and limitations of juries” factor. Ross, 396 US at 
538 n 10. See also In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F2d 1069, 
1079–80 (3d Cir 1980). Although this third factor sparked a twenty-year debate among 
courts and commentators about courts’ ability to strike a jury demand whenever a case 
was complex, see notes 32–33 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court ultimately con-
fined the third factor to cases in which “Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution 
of certain disputes to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity, and [in which] 
jury trials would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme.” Granfinanciera, 492 US at 
42 n 4. See also note 34 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Chauffeurs, 494 US at 570, quoting Curtis v Loether, 415 US 189, 196 (1974) 
(“Generally, an action for money damages was ‘the traditional form of relief offered in the 
courts of law.’”); Tull v United States, 481 US 412, 417 (1987) (“Prior to the Amendment’s 
adoption, a jury trial was customary in suits brought in the English law courts. In con-
trast, those actions that are analogous to 18th-century cases tried in courts of equity or 
admiralty do not require a jury trial.”); William Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 
458, 466 (Methuen 7th ed 1956) (A.L. Goodhart and H.G. Hanbury, eds) (describing eq-
uity’s ability to issue injunctive relief that common-law courts could not). 
 13 494 US 558 (1990). 
 14 Id at 565. See also Curtis, 415 US at 195–96 (noting that, although a claim’s analogy 
to “tort actions recognized at common law” was relevant, the “[m]ore important” consider-
ation was that “the relief sought here—actual and punitive damages—is the traditional 
form of relief offered in the courts of law”). 
 15 523 US 340 (1998). 
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the statutory action and the remedy sought”16—without indicat-
ing, as it had eight years earlier in Chauffeurs, that the “remedy 
sought” factor was more important.17 Likewise, City of Monterey v 
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd18 held that a jury was properly 
impaneled in a § 1983 action akin to an inverse-condemnation 
proceeding.19 In examining whether a § 1983 claim was jury tria-
ble, the justices’ opinions focused almost exclusively on the proper 
historical analogue in English practice.20 
The second step in the Seventh Amendment’s analysis asks 
whether a jury must determine specific factual issues within a 
jury-triable claim.21 In answering this question, the Court has 
identified four factors: the “common-law practice at the time of 
 
 16 Id at 342, 348. 
 17 The bulk of the Court’s analysis in Feltner focused on historical English practice, 
see id at 347–52, although the Court buttressed that evidence with the argument that, as 
a general rule, “monetary relief is legal.” Id at 352. 
 18 526 US 687 (1999). 
 19 Id at 694. 
 20 See id at 715–18 (Kennedy) (plurality): 
[A]s a matter of historical practice, when the government has taken property 
without providing an adequate means for obtaining redress, suits to recover just 
compensation have been framed as common-law tort actions. . . . [A]nd in these 
actions, as in other suits at common law, there was a right to trial by jury. 
See also id at 724 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), citing Feltner, 
523 US at 348 (“The Seventh Amendment inquiry looks first to the ‘nature of the statutory 
action.’ . . . The question before us, therefore, is . . . what common-law action is most analogous 
to a § 1983 claim.”); City of Monterey, 526 US at 734 (Souter concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“Like the Court, I am accordingly remitted to a search for any analogy 
that may exist and a consideration of any implication going to the substance of the jury 
right that the results of that enquiry may raise.”). The nature of the relief requested (dam-
ages) did not bear significantly on any of the opinions, although it entered briefly into the 
majority’s analysis. See id at 711 (“Because Del Monte Dunes’ statutory suit sounded in 
tort and sought legal relief, it was an action at law.”). 
 21 See, for example, Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370, 391 (1996) 
(holding that a judge, not a jury, should decide the proper construction of a patent, even 
when a jury would decide other issues regarding patent infringement). 
Beyond these two analytical steps, the Amendment influences certain other issues 
relevant to the allocation of decisionmaking power between judges and juries. For in-
stance, if a factual issue is relevant to both a claim that would be tried by a jury and a 
claim that would be tried by a judge, the Supreme Court has held that the jury should 
decide the overlapping facts. Beacon Theatres, Inc v Westover, 359 US 500, 510–11 (1959) 
(“[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal 
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.”). Likewise, in determining 
whether a disputed issue is a question of law (which a judge decides) or a question of fact 
(which a jury may decide), functional considerations about a jury’s capacity are often rel-
evant. See Hana Financial, Inc v Hana Bank, 135 S Ct 907, 911 (2015) (“[W]e have long 
recognized across a variety of doctrinal contexts that, when the relevant question is how 
an ordinary person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the 
decisionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer.”). 
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the framing” of the Seventh Amendment, “precedent,” “the rela-
tive interpretive skills of judges and juries,” and “the statutory 
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation” of the fact-
finding function.22 As with the first step, the weight given to the 
historical inquiry is considerable: “when possible, ‘ . . . the histor-
ical method’” should be used, and precedential or functional con-
siderations should be employed “[w]here history does not provide 
a clear answer.”23 
On issues of time frame and scope, there is no dispute: the 
Seventh Amendment preserves “[t]he right of trial by jury . . . 
which existed under the English common law when the Amend-
ment was adopted.”24 Thus, the relevant time frame is 1791, when 
the Seventh Amendment was ratified. The relevant scope of evi-
dence from 1791 is the English common-law courts: English 
common-law courts employed juries, while equity did not.25 
 
 22 Markman, 517 US at 384. In its only case applying Markman’s jury trial analysis, 
the Court applied three of these factors: “history,” “precedent,” and “functional consid-
erations.” City of Monterey, 526 US at 718. 
 23 City of Monterey, 526 US at 718, quoting Markman, 517 US at 378, 384. Moreover, 
in City of Monterey, the majority’s treatment of functional considerations was to some ex-
tent a rehash of its historical and precedential arguments. See City of Monterey, 526 US 
at 720–21. 
 24 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc v Redman, 295 US 654, 657 (1935). See also Curtis, 
415 US at 193 (“[T]he thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury 
trial as it existed in 1791.”); Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474, 476 (1935) (“In order to ascer-
tain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appro-
priate rules of the common law established at the time of adoption of that constitutional 
provision in 1791.”). The relevant scope (English practice) was established in United States 
v Wonson, 28 F Cases 745, 750 (CC D Mass 1812). Although Wonson was a circuit court 
opinion that concerned the Reexamination Clause, Justice Joseph Story’s opinion that the 
“common law” to which the Seventh Amendment refers was English common law effec-
tively settled the question. See id (“Beyond all question, the common law [ ] alluded to [in 
the Seventh Amendment] is not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably 
differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurispru-
dence.”). See also Dimick, 293 US at 477 (examining English precedents to determine the 
scope of the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial provision). Wonson did not, however, estab-
lish the proper time frame; Dimick and Redman established 1791 as the relevant date. 
See Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 Geo Wash L Rev 183, 187–92 (2000) (showing that the re-
sort to England’s common law as of 1791 was “a twentieth-century development”). See also 
Thompson v Utah, 170 US 343, 349–50 (1898) (holding that the criminal jury trial provi-
sion in Article III should be interpreted “with reference to the meaning affixed to [the 
words ‘jury’ and ‘trial by jury’] in the law as it was in this country and in England at the 
time of the adoption of that instrument”). 
 25 See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of 
the Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum L Rev 43, 44 (1980) (“[I]f the case could not be tried by 
jury, it could not in 1791 be tried at common law in any other way: until 1854 trial by jury 
was the only mode of trial known to the common law.”). 
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On the issue of indeterminacy, information about the English 
legal system in the late eighteenth century is plentiful, so that 
the problem of conflicting or absent evidence has tended to arise 
in only three limited, overlapping situations. First, because the 
boundary between common law and equity was ever shifting and 
the jurisdiction of the two systems sometimes extended over the 
same matters, an approach that picks an exact point in time 
(1791) and then sifts the evidence at that point for an exact an-
swer (jury triable or not) sometimes fails to capture the fluidity of 
jury trial practices in eighteenth-century England.26 Second, in 
rare instances, the historical evidence is so lacking that no con-
clusion about the proper analogue between a modern jury-triable 
question and eighteenth-century English practice can be drawn.27 
 
 26 See Chauffeurs, 494 US at 577 (Brennan concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), quoting Fleming James Jr, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L J 
655, 658 (1963) (“[T]he line between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-
jury trial) was not a fixed and static one.”) (brackets in original); Holdsworth, 1 A History 
of English Law at 445–76 (cited in note 12) (describing the evolution of equity jurisdiction 
from medieval to modern times and the “increase of [equity’s] business” over the course of 
the eighteenth century); F.W. Maitland, Equity: Also the Forms of Action at Common Law; 
Two Courses of Lectures 14 (Cambridge 1910) (A.H. Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker, eds) 
(“[I]n no general terms can we describe either the field of [English] equity or the distinctive 
character of equitable rules.”); David L. Shapiro and Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of 
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv L Rev 442, 449 (1971) 
(noting that, during the late eighteenth century, “significant changes in the relationship 
between law and equity were in process” in the English system); Galloway v United States, 
319 US 372, 392 (1943) (noting “the uncertainty and the variety of conclusion which fol-
lows from an effort at purely historical accuracy”). 
An excellent example of conflicting signals in the historical record is the intensive 
analysis done on two seventeenth-century Chancery suits, Clench v Tomley, 21 Eng Rep 
13 (Ch 1603), and Blad v Bamfield, 36 Eng Rep 992 (Ch 1674), from which scholars drew 
opposing conclusions about the general willingness of the Chancery to remove a case from 
a common-law jury. Compare Devlin, 80 Colum L Rev at 74–76 (cited in note 25) (arguing 
that Clench and Blad were “clear example[s] of the Chancellor’s willingness and ability to 
intervene in a common law action when he felt a jury unfit to decide a case”), with Morris 
S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 
128 U Pa L Rev 829, 840–46 (1980) (describing why these cases do not suggest a power to 
strike juries in complex cases), and James S. Campbell and Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex 
Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U Pa L Rev 965, 974–85 (1980) 
(arguing in response to then-Professor Morris Arnold that the substantive issues in Clench 
“would [ ] have taxed the mind of a seventeenth-century juror” and therefore justified the 
chancellor’s intervention in the case). 
 27 The classic example of absent evidence is Markman, in which the issue was the 
historical practice of juries construing patent claims. Markman, 517 US at 378–84. Be-
cause patent litigation was nascent at the end of the eighteenth century, no clear historical 
practice had emerged. Id at 380 (describing the “absence of an established practice [on 
using juries for patent claim construction] . . . , given the primitive state of jury patent 
practice at the end of the 18th century, when juries were still new to the field”). One reason 
that historical evidence was lacking in Markman is that its analysis was entirely ahistor-
ical; in 1791, when a case was tried to a jury, the jury determined all the facts. See The 
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Finally, the historical inquiry often requires reasoning by 
anachronism. When a present-day claim has a precise analogue 
to an action at common law, the jury trial question is easy.28 But 
many modern American claims—especially those alleging statu-
tory or regulatory violations—have no precise analogue in the 
common-law forms of action or in equity, thus requiring courts to 
ask whether a modern claim or factual issue, had it existed back 
in 1791, would have been tried to a jury or determined by the 
chancellor. The problem was already evident in 1830, when Jus-
tice Joseph Story argued that the Seventh Amendment’s right to 
civil jury trial extended to claims of statutory violations that nei-
ther existed at common law nor were available in 1791.29 A mod-
ern example is Chauffeurs, in which the claimed violation—
breach of a union’s duty of fair representation—was not cognizable 
at common law in 1791.30 The plurality, one of the concurrences, 
and the dissent split over whether the best analogy to such a duty 
was a common-law action for legal malpractice or an equitable 
suit for breach of a trustee’s fiduciary duty.31 
Perhaps the most vexing issue of indeterminacy arises from 
the technical nature or massive scope of some modern civil law-
suits. Such complexity in litigation was unknown at common law. 
 
Supreme Court 1995 Term: Leading Cases, 110 Harv L Rev 1, 272 (1996) (noting that 
Markman developed a “novel inquiry of its own design” and was an “extension of the his-
torical method . . . [that] is not quite as consistent with precedent as the Court implied”). 
See also James Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Spe-
cial Juries 9–15 (NYU 2006) (stating that “[i]t was customary to send ‘the whole matter’ 
to the jury,” but describing devices through which a judge could overturn the jury’s finding 
on a particular fact after trial). 
 28 For instance, a modern breach of contract claim seeking damages requires jury 
fact-finding because in 1791 the predecessors of a breach of contract claim—the writs of 
assumpsit and debt—were common-law actions. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English 
Legal History 282–90 (Butterworths 2d ed 1979) (describing the evolution from the common-
law forms of action to modern contract law). 
 29 Parsons, 28 US (3 Pet) at 446–47 (holding that the Seventh Amendment applied 
to “suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction 
to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were 
administered”). 
 30 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565–66 (Marshall) (plurality) (“An action for breach of a 
union’s duty of fair representation was unknown in 18th-century England; in fact, collec-
tive bargaining was unlawful.”). 
 31 Compare id at 569–70 (Marshall) (plurality) (finding “the malpractice analogy less 
convincing than the trust analogy” but ultimately stating that the historical inquiry 
“leaves us in equipoise”), with id at 582 (Stevens concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“I believe the duty of fair representation action resembles a common-law action 
against an attorney for malpractice more closely than it does any other form of action.”), 
and id at 586 (Kennedy dissenting) (“[T]he trust analogy is the controlling one here.”). 
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As a result, some courts32 and many scholars33 have explored 
whether the Seventh Amendment contains a “complexity excep-
tion” that allows courts to substitute judicial fact-finding for jury 
fact-finding in complex litigation.34 
 
 32 For federal decisions striking a jury trial, see ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp v In-
ternational Business Machines Corp, 458 F Supp 423, 444–49 (ND Cal 1978); Bernstein v 
Universal Pictures, Inc, 79 FRD 59, 65–71 (SDNY 1978); In re Boise Cascade Securities 
Litigation, 420 F Supp 99, 101–05 (WD Wash 1976). See also Towers v Titus, 5 Bankr 786, 
789–97 (ND Cal 1979) (applying the three Ross factors and finding that, under each factor, 
the issues were equitable, and noting on the third factor that “the size of the litigation and, 
more important[ly], the complexity of the relationships among the parties” made a rational 
jury decision impossible). Another district court struck a jury, but was reversed on appeal. 
Cotten v Witco Chemical Corp, 651 F2d 274, 276 (5th Cir 1981) (leaving open the possibility 
of a complexity exception on extraordinary facts). The Third Circuit refused to find a com-
plexity exception in the Seventh Amendment, but held that a jury might be struck on Fifth 
Amendment due process grounds. See Japanese Electronic Products, 631 F2d at 1079–89. 
For federal cases refusing to strike a jury demand despite the complexity of the case, see 
Brisk v City of Miami Beach, Florida, 726 F Supp 1305, 1314–15 (SD Fla 1989); Kian v 
Mirro Aluminum Co, 88 FRD 351, 354–56 (ED Mich 1980); Davis–Watkins Co v Service 
Merchandise Co, 500 F Supp 1244, 1251–52 (MD Tenn 1980); In re U.S. Financial Securi-
ties Litigation, 609 F2d 411, 431 (9th Cir 1979). See also Loral Corp v McDonnell Douglas 
Corp, 558 F2d 1130, 1132–33 (2d Cir 1977) (affirming the striking of a jury demand when 
the case would have exposed a jury to classified information and the parties arguably 
waived the right to jury trial by contract). 
Although not bound by the Seventh Amendment, see note 8, a few state courts have 
also examined the same issue under the comparable jury trial provisions in their state 
constitutions. See, for example, Kenney v Scientific, Inc, 512 A2d 1142, 1144–51 (NJ Super 
1986) (striking the jury demand), revd, 517 A2d 484 (NJ App 1986) (reinstating the jury 
demand); S.P.C.S., Inc v Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co, 631 P2d 999, 1002 
(Wash App 1981) (giving discretion to the trial court to try some issues to the bench and 
some to the jury). 
 33 During the 1970s and 1980s, the possibility of a “complexity exception” to the Seventh 
Amendment was one of the most hotly debated issues in American law reviews. For a 
sliver of the debate, see generally Arnold, 128 U Pa L Rev 829 (cited in note 26); Campbell 
and Le Poidevin, 128 U Pa L Rev 965 (cited in note 26); Devlin, 80 Colum L Rev 43 (cited 
in note 25); Roger W. Kirst, The Jury’s Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 Wash L Rev 
1 (1982); Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judg-
ment, 80 Mich L Rev 68 (1981); Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U Chi L Rev 581 (1984); Note, The Case for 
Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 Yale L J 1155 (1980); Montgomery Kersten, 
Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 Stan L Rev 99 (1979); 
Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 Harv L Rev 898 (1979). 
 34 Although the Court has never addressed the matter directly, its recent opinions 
provide little hope for a “complexity exception.” For instance, in Tull, the Court relied ex-
clusively on the first two factors from Ross (historical practice and the nature of the relief 
requested) to determine the scope of a jury trial right; it noted that the third factor—the 
“practical abilities and limitations of juries” factor that had sparked the debate over the 
existence of a complexity exception—had been used only to justify the elimination of juries 
in administrative proceedings, and had never been used “as an independent basis for ex-
tending the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.” Tull, 481 US at 418 n 4. 
See also Granfinanciera, 492 US at 42 n 4. Despite this discouraging tone, some scholars 
continue to press for such an exception. See, for example, James Oldham, On the Question 
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When the historical record is indeterminate, all is not lost. In 
the face of conflicting or absent evidence of eighteenth-century 
English practice, the Court has tended to rely more heavily on the 
remaining factors that bear on the right to jury trial.35 These oc-
casional failings in the historical record have not led to general 
dissatisfaction with the Seventh Amendment’s focus on Founding-
era English practice.36 On the contrary, the text of the Seventh 
Amendment (that the right to jury trial “shall be preserved”) in-
vites a historical analysis. And the relevant evidence (English le-
gal practice) is bounded in scope, has been methodically analyzed 
by generations of historians, and avoids the value-laden inquiries 
into “intent” or “public meaning” that often plague historically 
grounded interpretive or constructive inquiries into other consti-
tutional texts. 
But history sometimes holds a surprise. Part I of this Article 
uncovers evidence that unsettles the traditional understanding of 
jury trials in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English prac-
tice. Although their workings have since been lost to history, Par-
liament established special “courts of judicature” to resolve dis-
putes arising out of fires that ravaged urban areas in England 
from the middle of the seventeenth century until the early nine-
teenth century. The most famous of the fires—the Great Fire of 
London in 1666—destroyed five-sixths of the City of London, in-
cluding 13,200 homes and shops, 87 churches, and 44 guildhalls, 
along with wharves, warehouses, jails, and public buildings.37 As 
devastating as the social dislocation resulting from the Great Fire 
 
of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 Ohio 
St L J 1031, 1051–53 (2010) (advocating for a complexity exception in light of eighteenth-
century procedural devices through which judges controlled juries in major commercial 
disputes). 
 35 See notes 11, 17, and accompanying text. 
 36 Justice William Brennan demonstrated the greatest disagreement with the his-
torical test, ultimately concluding that the historical inquiry should be abandoned in favor 
of an analysis principally focused on whether the relief sought in the case was historically 
available from the common-law courts. See Chauffeurs, 494 US at 574–75 (Brennan con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court “has repeatedly 
discounted the significance of” English practice in 1791, so that it is “not equal in weight” 
to the “nature of the remedy” factor and should be “dispense[d] with [ ] altogether”). Even 
this approach, which no other justice adopted, is inspired by historical English practice. 
 37 See Walter George Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 174, 210, 223–24 (John 
Lane 2d ed 1920); T.F. Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London after the Great Fire 26 (Jonathan 
Cape 1940). The fire also consumed considerable property beyond the walls of the City. 
See Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 174 (cited in note 37). 
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was,38 the threatened economic devastation was greater, for in a 
world of limited investment opportunities, a great deal of London’s 
wealth was tied up in the leases and subleases of buildings turned 
to ash.39 The “Fire Court” established in the wake of the Great 
Fire issued 1,585 decrees;40 its mission was not only to resolve le-
gal disputes over ownership, possession, and rents, but also to en-
courage London’s expeditious rebuilding.41 Later fire courts re-
solved fewer cases (because the damage was less extensive than 
it had been in London) but carried the same mission.42 
 
 38 Because the population of London was unknown, estimates about the number of 
people left homeless by the fire vary widely. John Evelyn, a contemporary diarist, thought 
that 200,000 had fled into Islington and Highgate, two of London’s near suburbs. See 2 
The Diary of John Evelyn 258 (MacMillan 1906) (entry for Sept 7, 1666). Given that the 
population of the City in 1666 was likely less than 100,000, a figure of 75,000 displaced 
residents is more reasonable. See Stephen Porter, The Great Fire of London 71 (Sutton 
1998) (giving a range of 65,000 to 80,000 residents left homeless, with 76,500 being a likely 
estimate). 
 39 See William C. Baer, The Institution of Residential Investment in Seventeenth-
Century London, 76 Bus Hist Rev 515, 516–20 (2002). The cost of the fire in terms of de-
stroyed real and personal property, lost rents, and the like was on the order of £10 million. 
See Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 223–24 (cited in note 37); Porter, The Great 
Fire of London at 71–73 (cited in note 38). At the time, the median annual income in London 
was probably less than £60. See William C. Baer, Stuart London’s Standard of Living: Re-
examining the Settlement of Tithes of 1638 for Rents, Income, and Poverty, 63 Econ Hist 
Rev 612, 629 (2010). 
 40 Of these decrees, eight were appeals from prior decisions of the Fire Court. See 
generally Master List of Fire Court Decrees (on file with author). The total of 1,585 decrees 
understates the Fire Court’s work, for the Fire Court sometimes resolved between 2 and 4 
petitions in a single decree. See generally id. A single decree might also cover multiple 
properties. See, for example, Clerke v Chapman, A 4, 4 (London Fire Ct Mar 7, 1667) (ad-
judicating claims to “severall peices of ground and Messuages [that is, houses]”). As in the 
example above, when referring to a specific decree, I provide the case name, followed by 
the volume, the first page of the decree, and the particular page referenced (for example, 
“A 4, 4”), and finally the name of the court and the date of the decree. The letters indicating 
the volumes in which the fire-court cases may be found correspond to the nine volumes of 
fire-court cases (A–I) housed in the London Metropolitan Archives. 
 41 In the preamble to the act establishing the Fire Court, Parliament noted that the 
harshness of the common law both thwarted any attempt to justly spread “a proportionable 
share of the losse according to [the parties’] severall Interests” and threatened delays that 
“would much obstruct the rebuilding of the [ ] Citty.” 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 
Statutes of the Realm 601, 601. On January 31, 1667, the House of Commons assented to 
this bill, which had passed in the House of Lords on January 23, 1667. See 12 HL J 87 
(Jan 23, 1667); 8 HC J 687 (Jan 31, 1667). According to the calendar then in use, in which 
the new year began on Lady Day (March 25), the date of the statute’s enactment was 1666. 
This Article follows modern dating conventions. 
 42 In addition to the Fire Court established for London, Parliament constituted fire 
courts to handle the legal ramifications of urban fires in Northampton (1675), Southwark 
(1676), Warwick (1694), Tiverton (1731), Blandford (1731), Wareham (1762), and Chudleigh 
(1807). 27 Car II (1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798–801 (Northampton); 29 Car 
II, ch 4 (1677), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 842, 842–45 (Southwark); 6 & 7 Wm & Mary 
(1694) (private act) (Warwick) (on file with author); 5 Geo II, ch 14 (1731) (Tiverton) (on 
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For Seventh Amendment purposes, these courts contained 
one critical feature. In the act establishing London’s Fire Court, 
Parliament gave the common-law judges who composed the court 
the discretion to employ—or not to employ—juries.43 The records 
of the Fire Court reveal that in no case did the judges impanel a 
jury.44 Later acts contained equivalent provisions regarding juries.45 
Parliament’s power to suspend the right to a civil jury trial in 
the fire cases was established well before 1791 and continued to 
be exercised into the nineteenth century. In light of this history, 
Part II argues that Congress enjoys the historical license to dele-
gate to federal judges a comparable authority to resolve disputes 
without civil juries. While the history does not give Congress an 
all-purpose writ to suspend the right to jury trial in complex 
cases, the history of the fire courts permits Congress to delegate 
to federal judges the authority to dispense with civil juries when 
 
file with author); 5 Geo II, ch 16 (1731) (Blandford) (on file with author); 3 Geo III, ch 54 
(1762) (Wareham) (on file with author); 48 Geo III, ch 89 (1808) (Chudleigh) (on file with 
author). See also Frank Sharman, Fires and Fire Laws up to the Middle of the Eighteenth 
Century, 22 Cambrian L Rev 42, 48–50 (1991) (describing the fire-court laws). 
The Northampton Fire Court disposed of 85 property claims after a fire in 1675 de-
stroyed approximately 700 out of 840 buildings in the town. See Frank A. Sharman, The 
Northampton Fire Court, in J.A. Guy and H.G. Beale, eds, Law and Social Change in Brit-
ish History 118, 119, 121 (Swift 1984). The Southwark Fire Court heard fifty-two cases 
after a fire in 1676 destroyed as many as six hundred homes. See generally Court of Judi-
cature Decrees, Fire of Southwark (1677) (copy from the London Metropolitan Archives on 
file with author); 1098 London Gazette 2 (May 25–29, 1676) (estimating a loss of six hun-
dred houses). The Warwick Fire Court heard at least 31 petitions arising from a fire that 
destroyed approximately 150 buildings. See Michael Farr, ed, The Great Fire of Warwick 
1694: The Records of the Commissioners Appointed under an Act of Parliament for Re-
building the Town of Warwick 369–407 (Dugdale Society 1992) (reporting two different 
estimates of the damage (144 or 156 buildings) and reproducing thirty-one draft decrees 
of the court). 
 43 See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602 (stating 
that the court may reach its decision “upon the verdict or inquisition of Jurors testimony 
of witnesses upon oath, Examination of partyes interessed, or by all or any of the said 
wayes or otherwise according to their Discretions proceede to the hearing and determining 
of the Demands or Differences betweene the said Partyes”). 
 44 In one case, described in notes 102–05 and accompanying text, the London Fire 
Court referred a matter regarding the value of land to a jury. The Fire Court had no juris-
diction to value land that was taken to widen streets during the rebuilding of London; by 
statute, Parliament gave that task to a jury impaneled by the lord mayor and Court of 
Aldermen of London. 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8, § 23 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 608; 
22 Car II, ch 11, § 32 (1670), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 665, 672. 
 45 The seven statutes passed after the creation of the London Fire Court varied some-
what in the language in which they provided the courts with the discretion to dispense 
with juries. See note 101. Later legislation required the use of juries for one function that 
the London Fire Court had not been empowered to perform: valuing private land taken for 
rebuilding purposes. See note 121 and accompanying text. 
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suspension is a necessary and tailored component of legislation 
validly enacted to foster recovery from a national crisis. 
This fact has important implications. Whether responding to 
an economic collapse like the mortgage crisis in the late 2000s or 
a catastrophe like September 11th, Congress has often turned to 
administrative solutions to award or limit damages arising from 
disaster.46 The history of the fire courts shows that, under certain 
conditions, Congress has another streamlined option for distrib-
uting monetary relief that is integral to fostering national recov-
ery: Article III courts, which can blend equitable (injunctive) and 
common-law (compensatory) powers without needing to impanel 
a jury. 
The Conclusion explores a final question: whether this his-
tory should alter understandings about the Seventh Amendment’s 
right to jury trial that became settled in the absence of such evi-
dence. From a variety of interpretive standpoints, the answer is 
yes. History matters. 
I.  THE FIRE COURTS 
England was plagued by disastrous urban fires from the sev-
enteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Speedy rebuilding of 
devastated communities was essential to their revitalization. In 
a world largely devoid of fire insurance, a common roadblock to 
the necessary rebuilding was the existence of disputes between 
landlords and tenants about their respective obligations to re-
build damaged homes and buildings. Establishing a structure to 
resolve these disputes was critical. Out of this felt need Parlia-
ment developed the fire courts. The first such court, the London 
Fire Court, created the template used for later courts. This tem-
plate left the use of juries to each fire court’s discretion, and the 
judges sitting on these fire courts routinely exercised their discre-
tion by choosing not to impanel juries. 
A. The London Fire Court 
The Great Fire of London began shortly after midnight on 
September 2, 1666, and burned uncontrolled for more than three 
days.47 The summer had been hot and dry, and a strong wind was 
 
 46 See note 172 and accompanying text. 
 47 For a day-by-day—indeed, street-by-street—description of the progress of the fire, 
see John Bedford, London’s Burning 37–132 (Abelard-Schuman 1966). The fire was so in-
tense that Samuel Pepys reported seeing cellars still smoldering from the fire the following 
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blowing.48 Most of London’s streets, lanes, and alleys were nar-
row. Its buildings were timber. The upper floors of houses were 
often cantilevered over the pathways below, so that the top floors 
on one side nearly touched those on the other.49 It was a recipe for 
disaster—a recipe perfected when the fire started near, and 
quickly spread to, one of London’s main waterworks, depriving 
the few willing to fight the fire of a ready source of water.50 
Rebuilding London was a political and economic priority. At 
the time, England’s prospects in the Second Dutch War were un-
certain, and the spendthrift King Charles II was relying on loans 
from the City of London and its wealthiest citizens to finance the 
war and prepare defenses against an expected Dutch invasion.51 
The City’s own finances were precarious even before the Fire; and 
with a considerable portion of its revenues tied up in leases of City 
property to tenants, the Fire and the royal demand for money 
pushed the City to the brink of bankruptcy.52 Because Charles II 
 
March. See 8 The Diary of Samuel Pepys 114 (California 1974) (Robert Latham and William 
Matthews, eds) (entry for Mar 16, 1667). See also 7 The Diary of Samuel Pepys 393 (California 
1972) (Robert Latham and William Matthews, eds) (entry for Dec 1, 1666) (describing a 
fire being rekindled in a cellar by strong winds). 
 48 See Porter, The Great Fire of London at 33–34 (cited in note 38). 
 49 See Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 11 (cited in note 37); Porter, The 
Great Fire of London at 11–19 (cited in note 38). 
 50 See Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 28–30 (cited in note 37). Finding a 
way to encourage the rebuilding of the waterworks while satisfying the divergent interests 
of its beneficial and legal owners presented the Fire Court with one of its greatest chal-
lenges, and was one of its greatest accomplishments; by tackling and resolving the issue 
early in its existence, the court assured prospective builders of a reliable source of water. 
See generally Morris v Morris, A 199 (London Fire Ct Apr 27, 1667). See also Reddaway, 
The Rebuilding of London at 98–99 (cited in note 37). 
 51 See 72 Repertories Ct Aldermen 9 (Nov 13, 1666) (appointing a committee to ad-
vise the lord chancellor of the exchequer of the “backwardnes” of Charles II in his repay-
ment of “the great sumes of money” lent by the City); id at 117v (June 11, 1667) (providing 
Charles II with £105,000 to supply regiments that were to resist the attacks of the Dutch 
in the River Thames); Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 41 (cited in note 37) (noting 
that “London was almost indispensable to [England’s] chances of success” in the war). To 
allay fears that he would not repay his creditors, Charles II took the unusual step of as-
suring them that he would do so. Declaration of Charles II on June 18, 1667, reprinted in 
166 London Gazette 2 (June 17–20, 1667). Less than five years later, he reneged on the 
promise, ruining some wealthy financiers. See J. Keith Horsefield, The “Stop of the Ex-
chequer” Revisited, 35 Econ Hist Rev 511, 513–16 (1982). 
Aside from war, Charles II needed money to fund an extravagant lifestyle. He was 
once described as a man “who liked his fun, thought Puritanism no religion for a gentle-
man, and acted accordingly.” M.M. Knappen, Constitutional and Legal History of England 
443–44 (Harcourt Brace 1942). 
 52 See Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 42, 68–71 (cited in note 37). See also 
id at 74 (noting that the City was a considerable landlord, deriving one-quarter of its op-
erating revenue from leases). 
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also obtained substantial money from customs and excise taxes 
and from a hearth tax (levied on fireplaces), the destruction of the 
customshouse, wharves, and more than thirteen thousand build-
ings caused another significant drop in royal revenue.53 The ca-
tastrophe also had a great impact on charities, churches, civic 
groups, and private persons, including widows and children, 
many of whom relied on income from leased property for their op-
erations or subsistence.54 Others used leases as investment vehi-
cles to raise capital;55 they potentially faced ruin unless their in-
terests were restored. In short, rebuilding London quickly was 
essential on numerous fronts, from the geopolitical to the finan-
cial to the familial. 
But rebuilding posed enormous political obstacles (both local 
and national), as well as financial, social, aesthetic, and legal 
challenges.56 Legal issues arose on two fronts. First, law was 
 
 53 See id at 41–42 (noting that London’s “actual share of the total taxes [paid to the 
Crown] was large,” that money could not be obtained from creditors who lent on the secu-
rity of the customs and excise duties that had been collected in London, and that “[c]himney 
money . . . stopped coming in”). “Chimney money” was another name for the hearth tax. It 
had first been imposed by Parliament in 1662 to supplement Charles II’s annual royal 
revenue. See 14 Car II, ch 10 (1662), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 390, 390–93; Paul F. Figley 
and Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 Mich L Rev 
1207, 1225 n 141 (2009) (describing the importance of the hearth tax to the century-long 
struggle over parliamentary sovereignty in matters of the purse). 
 54 See Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 76 (cited in note 37). For instance, 
the widow of Peter Morris, whose grandfather had built the Thames waterworks, alleged 
that the £300 per year that she was granted under the terms of a trust established on her 
husband’s death were “her whole subsistance.” Morris, A at 200, 202. For a particularly 
complex familial arrangement, involving rents from the leases of “three mesuages or ten-
ements,” distributed among two children and six grandchildren, see Babington v Beake, C 22v, 
22v (London Fire Ct Nov 22, 1667). 
 55 See Philip E. Jones, 1 The Fire Court: Calendar to the Judgments and Decrees of 
the Court of Judicature Appointed to Determine Differences between Landlords and Ten-
ants as to Rebuilding after the Great Fire. v (Clowes 1966) (“The apparent frequency with 
which leases were assigned might suggest that at times it was a form of investment, a 
quick profit being taken through an increased fine [a lump-sum payment made on execu-
tion of the lease].”); Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 75 (cited in note 37) (noting 
that the Great Fire “had destroyed a substantial part of the accumulated savings of gen-
erations and had wiped out most of the security behind a highly complicated system of 
investment”); Baer, 76 Bus Hist Rev at 518–19 (cited in note 39) (describing the ways in 
which London property could be used as an investment). For instance, in Clerke v Chapman, 
A 4 (London Fire Ct Mar 7, 1667), a tenant had obtained from a third party an unspecified 
sum of money, and in return agreed to pay the third party an annuity of £40 per year for 
a term of years; £150 was still owing at the time of the Great Fire. The sense of the trans-
action was that the tenant had sublet the premises to others, using the rents to pay the 
annuity. Clerke, A at 13. 
 56 The discussion in this paragraph derives from Professor T.F. Reddaway’s classic 
history of the rebuilding process, see Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 68–170 
 1908  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1893 
   
needed to impose a framework on the rebuilding process. It was 
necessary to establish building regulations that limited the risk 
of future catastrophic fire: buildings must be made of brick, they 
must not exceed a certain height, and they must not overhang the 
streets. Streets themselves would be widened, with private 
ground taken for the purpose. With these changes came others: a 
survey system to determine boundaries and settle disputes 
among neighbors; a mechanism to value property taken for public 
purposes or made worthless by widened streets; a tax on coal to 
finance both this eminent domain system and the reconstruction 
of public buildings; a sanction (escheat of the property to the City 
of London) if a property owner refused to rebuild within a reason-
able time; provisions requiring owners to share rebuilding costs 
(such as party walls) that benefited multiple properties; regula-
tions on the price and quality of raw materials used in rebuilding; 
and incentives to encourage skilled craftsmen to come to London, 
despite the sometimes onerous burdens of the City’s creaking 
guild system.57 With significant prodding from the City and 
Charles II, Parliament passed legislation in February 1667 that 
covered most of these matters;58 the more mundane were left to 
London’s Court of Common Council and Court of Aldermen.59 
Law was also relevant in a second way that was less socially 
beneficial. The leases, mortgages, and annuities that defined the 
obligations of owners, landlords, tenants, and financiers were, of 
course, contracts. At the time of the Great Fire, the institution of 
 
(cited in note 37), as well as from my reading of the records of London’s Court of Aldermen 
and its Court of Common Council. 
 57 See id at 79–85, 113–20, 150–67. 
 58 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 603–12. The Common 
Council worked to draft the rebuilding legislation. See 46 J Ct Common Council 132–34 
(Nov 30, 1666). The Court of Aldermen drafted other proposals and sent delegates to lobby 
Charles II and influential figures in Parliament and at the royal court. See 72 Repertories 
Ct Aldermen 6v (Nov 8, 1666), 21–21v (Dec 4, 1666), 26v (Dec 8, 1666), 29v (Dec 16, 1666), 
32–32v (Jan 8, 1667), 43v (Jan 22, 1667). The Court of Aldermen even provided gifts that 
today may be less charitably described as bribes: £100 to the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, Edward Turnor, as a “loving remembrance from this Court for his many kind 
offices,” id at 21 (Dec 4, 1666) (rendering Turnor’s name as “Turner”), and “halfe a ton” of 
the best claret to the attorney general as a similar “loving remembrance,” id at 29v (Dec 
21, 1666). In the end, Parliament passed legislation only after Charles II exerted “firm 
pressure,” refusing to end the Parliament until it passed rebuilding legislation. Reddaway, 
The Rebuilding of London at 86, 88 (cited in note 37). See also 8 HC J 684 (Jan 26, 1667) 
(reporting on a message from Charles II expressing his concern for “the Desolation of the 
City” and urging the House of Commons to “apply themselves to the Dispatch of those Bills 
which concerned the City”). 
 59 See, for example, 72 Repertories Ct Aldermen 6v (Nov 7, 1666) (granting a City 
tenant the right to dig up five acres of leased land to make bricks). 
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fire insurance had not yet developed,60 meaning that losses were 
allocable among the contracting parties. As a general rule, that 
fact spelled disaster for tenants. A covenant in most leases obli-
gated the tenant to repair or rebuild the premises in case of fire—
even if the tenant was without fault and even if the fire started 
elsewhere.61 The tenant was also required to continue to pay rent 
during the time that the premises were damaged.62 
The common-law courts were unlikely to relieve tenants of 
these agreements. In Paradine v Jane,63 a tenant who had failed 
to pay rent for a period of three years defended himself by claim-
ing that he had been forced from occupation by royalist forces during 
the English Civil War; because these forces allegedly included a 
foreign soldier fighting for King Charles I, the tenant argued that 
the willful act of a foreign enemy excused his payment.64 Paradine 
 
 60  Jones, 1 The Fire Court at vi (cited in note 55) (“[The tenant] would have no in-
surance to soften the blow.”). The Great Fire “stimulated the development of fire insur-
ance.” Id at v. See also Porter, The Great Fire of London at 153–54 (cited in note 38) (de-
scribing the rise of the first fire insurance companies in the late seventeenth century). 
 61 See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at vi (cited in note 55). The Fire Court decrees often 
recited the substance of the covenant. See, for example, Franke v Deane and Chapter of 
the Collegiate Church of St. Peter of Westminster, H 190, 190v (London Fire Ct July 2, 
1672) (describing “a covenant on the Tenants part to repaire and uphold the premisses 
and soe to leave the same at the end of the said terme”). On rare occasions a lease omitted 
such a term. See, for example, Sing v Woodcock, E 60, 61 (London Fire Ct Dec 10, 1668). 
 62 See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at vi (cited in note 55). Leases of twenty-one years 
were common, but many exceeded that length. Baer, 76 Bus Hist Rev at 538 (cited in note 39). 
A typical lease required a tenant to pay a combination of a “fine,” which was a lump sum 
due on execution of the lease, and rent in annual or quarterly installments. This system 
allowed a lessor to extract capital for immediate consumption or investment, albeit with a 
reduction in rental income in future years. Some leases, however, involved “rack rent[s],” 
in which no fine was due and the rent reflected full market value. See id at 519 n 11, 538–
39 (describing the frequency and purpose of fines). Three cases suffice to show the array 
of leasing arrangements. In deCayne v Harding, A 25 (London Fire Ct Mar 28, 1667), the 
tenant paid a fine of £30 and an annual rent of £22 for a thirteen-year lease on a messuage. 
Id at 25. In Bathurst v Wardens and Comonalty of the Mistery of Skinners London, E 18v 
(London Fire Ct Nov 17, 1668), the tenant paid a fine of £300 and £6 per year (in quarterly 
payments) for a lease of twenty-three years on a messuage; two months later, the tenant 
subleased the property “without ffine” for £50 per year. Id at 19. In Rosewell v Thomas, G 1 
(London Fire Ct Jan 17, 1671), a tenant leased from the Cathedral of St. Paul’s, for an 
unstated duration and for a £200 fine, two messuages and some ground, and then sublet 
the premises for twenty-four years at a rent of £20 for the first three-and-one-half years 
and £60 thereafter. Id at 1. Eleven years later the subtenant relet one of the messuages 
for most of the remaining lease term, receiving only a “competent ffine” and a yearly rent 
of £20 in view of the “great charges to bee layd out in repairatons” by the sub-subtenant. Id. 
 63 82 Eng Rep 897 (KB 1647). 
 64 Id at 897. 
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rejected the plea on three grounds,65 the third and most exten-
sively reasoned of which was that, while a court of law would ex-
cuse a tenant who was unable to act because of a foreign enemy 
from a “duty or charge” created by law, “the party [who] by his 
own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself [ ] is bound to 
make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevita-
ble necessity, because he might have provided against it by his 
contract.”66 In language that anticipated the Great Fire, the court 
continued: “And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house, 
though it be burnt by lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet 
he ought to repair it.”67 
But there was also contrary thinking that tenants would find 
relief in the courts. Albeit in a most unsatisfactory way, a hapless 
Frenchman, Robert Hubert, had confessed to starting the Great 
Fire; he was convicted with celerity and hanged for the crime on 
October 29, 1666.68 Samuel Pepys reported on a dinner conversa-
tion with the noted lawyer Lord John Crew, in which Crew indi-
cated that “the Judges ha[d] determined” that tenants were not 
required to bear the loss of fire when it was started by an enemy; 
and France, Hubert’s native land, was allied with the Dutch in 
the ongoing war.69 Although Paradine seems decisively to support 
the opposite view,70 Pepys thought that this argument was “an 
excellent Salvo for the Tenants.”71 
 
 65 The first ground held that the tenant had pleaded that the enemies held the leased 
premises for about two-and-three-quarters years, thus failing to plead an excuse for non-
payment of the entire three years. Id. The second ground held that the tenant had failed 
to plead that the entire army was foreign. Id. The foreign soldier was alleged to be Prince 
Rupert, see id, a German-born nephew of Charles I who had received titles of English no-
bility and was at the time leading the English forces fighting for Charles I. Prince Rupert 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, July 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/735G-G4N6. 
 66 Paradine, 82 Eng Rep at 897. 
 67 Id. In case the point were not already clear, the court further observed that even 
if the leased land had been “made barren by wildfire, yet the lessor shall have his whole 
rent.” Id at 898. 
 68 For a copy of Hubert’s indictment, see Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 
353–54 (cited in note 37). No one in authority, including the judge who sentenced him to 
hang, believed that Hubert had committed the crime. See id at 191–95, 200–08. 
 69 See 7 The Diary of Samuel Pepys at 357 (cited in note 47) (entry for Nov 5, 1666); Anglo-
Dutch Wars (Encyclopædia Britannica, July 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QC5G-DE75. 
 70 The language in Paradine was perhaps ambiguous enough to create room for the 
tenants’ argument, but Pepys likely misunderstood the import of Crew’s comments. 
Pepys’s desire to do so was understandable, given that his own father would have benefited 
from such a ruling. See 7 The Diary of Samuel Pepys at 357 (cited in note 47) (entry for 
Nov 5, 1666). It is also possible that Crew misunderstood Paradine, or thought it wrong 
(because it had been rendered by the King’s Bench after the arrest of Charles I and impli-
cated the actions of forces loyal to the Crown). See note 65. 
 71 See 7 The Diary of Samuel Pepys at 357 (cited in note 47) (entry for Nov 5, 1666). 
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Parliament had no similar illusions. The preamble to the act 
creating the Fire Court recited that “Many of the Tennants Under 
tennants or late Occupiers [ ] are lyeable unto Suites and Actions 
to compell them to repaire and rebuild [their houses] and to pay 
their Rents as if the same had not beene burned and are not 
releiveable therein in any ordinary course of Law.”72 But neither 
was the situation entirely happy for landlords. Not only did they 
face the prospect of long delays and expense in bringing cases in 
the common-law courts,73 but they were also liable at law to the 
tenants if they prematurely sought to reenter or relet the leased 
premises in order to facilitate reconstruction.74 Moreover, even if 
they were successful in the law courts, landlords faced the prospect 
of tenants bringing suit in equity to obtain relief from the terms of 
their leases;75 and regardless of the likelihood of success, equity’s 
process was notoriously long and expensive.76 
These legal realities intersected with cultural realities in a 
way that was particularly unhelpful to efforts to rebuild. During 
the seventeenth century, London’s property owners almost in-
variably preferred not to put their own capital into building proj- 
ects. Instead, they sought out developers for their properties, giv-
ing the developers sufficiently favorable and lengthy lease terms 
that the developers could recover the cost of construction (plus a 
profit) during the lease period. Owners took their profits on sub-
sequent leases.77 Thus, a tenant who had only a short time left on 
 
 72 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601. 
 73 See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601 (noting 
that “great Differences are like to arise concerning the said Repaires and new Building of 
the said Houses and payment of Rents which if they should not be determined with all 
speede and without charge would much obstruct the rebuilding of the said Citty”). 
 74 Depending on the circumstances, the tenant had a variety of potential actions 
against the landlord, including a writ of covenant, a writ of ejection, and a writ of trespass. 
See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 156–57, 199–212 
(Chicago 1979). 
 75 For a contemporary case in which a tenant turned to equity to obtain relief from 
the payment of rent and to force the landlord to accept a surrender of a lease, see Harrison 
v North, 22 Eng Rep 706, 706 (Ch 1667). See also 2 A General Abridgment of Cases in 
Equity, Argued and Adjudged in the High Court of Chancery, Etc.: Vol. II. [1667–1744] 245 
(undated), in 22 Eng Rep 1, 208 (discussing cases in which equity granted relief against a 
forfeiture for nonpayment of rent after the common-law courts had granted the landlord’s 
request for ejectment). 
 76 For a scathing critique of the dilatoriness and extravagance of seventeenth-century 
equity practice, see Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law at 423–42 (cited in note 12). 
 77 See Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy: 1558–1641 357–63 (Clarendon 
1965) (describing seventeenth-century practices for developing the suburbs in the West 
End). Having been leveled to the ground, London was likely to require similar real estate 
investment practices if it were to rebuild successfully. 
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a lease had little incentive to rebuild a house, which (given the 
new building codes requiring construction in brick) would likely 
be an expensive and substantial improvement over the burned-
down timber house. The tenant needed a sufficiently long lease, 
and favorable lease terms, to be induced to undertake the con-
struction. The law, however, did not permit judges to calibrate the 
parties’ legal rights to achieve the best incentives to rebuild.78 
The solution that emerged was to establish a court with a 
specific charge and unique remedial powers. This court was com-
posed of England’s twelve common-law judges.79 Its task was “to 
heare and to determine all Differences and Demands whatsoever 
which have arisen or may any way arise betweene Landlords Pro-
prietors Tennants Lessees Under Tennants or late Occupiers of 
any the said Houses or Buildings.”80 This broad mandate included 
disputes concerning “the payment defalcation apportioning or 
abatement of any Rent or Rents” that arose after September 1, 
1666; disputes “touching any Covenant Condition or Penalty”; 
and disputes “touching or concerning the prefixing or limitting of 
any time for such Repaires or new Building Rebuilding or any 
Rate or Contribution to be borne or paid thereunto by any person 
or persons Bodyes pollitique or corporate interessed in the 
Premisses.”81 Due to the variety of property arrangements, Par-
liament recognized that “noe certaine generall rule can be pre-
scribed.”82 It did establish, however, a principle to govern the 
court’s work: “it is just that every one concerned should beare a pro-
portionable share of the losse according to their severall Interests.”83 
 
 78 In light of the reality that many inhabitants had abandoned London and taken up 
long-term leases in its suburbs or elsewhere, property owners were also finding it difficult 
to induce new developers to take up the task of rebuilding. Indeed, in taking stock of the 
past year on the last day of 1666, Pepys wrote despairingly that “[t]he City [is] less and 
less likely to be built again, everybody settling elsewhere, and nobody encouraged to 
trade.” 7 The Diary of Samuel Pepys at 426 (cited in note 47) (entry for Dec 31, 1666). The 
pace of rebuilding remained slow for the following two years. See Reddaway, The Rebuild-
ing of London at 244–83 (cited in note 37) (describing the progress of reconstruction for 
houses, halls, and churches). 
 79 At the time, there were three common-law courts—Common Pleas, Kings Bench, 
and the Exchequer—with four justices appointed to each court. See Holdsworth, 1 A His-
tory of English Law at 195 (cited in note 12); Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 40 & nn 41, 
44 (cited in note 74) (noting that there were generally four judges in each court, although 
a fifth was on occasion appointed). 
 80 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601. 
 81 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. 
 82 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601. 
 83 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601. 
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To give this principle practical effect, Parliament granted the 
court the authority “where they shall thinke it convenient to order 
the surrendring, increasing abridgeing ceasing determining or 
charging of any Estates in the Premisses,” including the power “to 
order new or longer Leases or Estates not exceeding Forty 
yeares . . . at such Rents and Fines or without any Rent or Fine 
as they shall thinke fitt.”84 The court’s decisions bound not only 
“all persons concerned” with the property but also their “Heirs 
Successors Executors Administrators and Assignes”; and if that 
preclusive effect were somehow unclear, Parliament further pro-
vided that even those under a legal disability (such as infancy or 
insanity), ecclesiastical persons and corporations, and “all other 
person or persons Bodyes Naturall and Pollitique their Heires 
and Successors and their respective Interests shall be bound and 
concluded by such respective Order or Orders.”85 The primary 
limit on the court’s power was temporal: the legislation contained a 
sunset provision that terminated the court on December 31, 1668.86 
The judges of the Fire Court had not, however, finished the 
backlog of cases by the end of 1668. Although it took two years for 
Parliament to pass legislation reconstituting the court, ultimately 
Parliament thrice revived or extended the court’s sunset date. 
With each of these enactments, Parliament expanded the power 
of the Fire Court over its existing caseload or extended its juris-
diction to hear cases arising from other fires.87 
 
 84 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 2 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. Parliament 
placed one limit on this power: the court could not diminish “auntient [ancient] and 
accustomable Rents” when the “Lawes of this Realme doe forbid” such diminishment. 18 
& 19 Car II, ch 7, § 2 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. Numerous ecclesiastical, 
charitable, and educational entities, such as the Cathedral of St. Paul, St. Bartholomew 
Hospital, and Christchurch College in Oxford, held land in the City under ancient grants. 
See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xviii–xix (cited in note 55). 
 85 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 2 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. 
 86 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 5 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. 
 87 For instance, in the first reauthorization statute, Parliament expanded the Fire 
Court’s jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from other London fires that preceded 
the Great Fire. See 22 Car II, ch 11, § 31 (1670), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 665, 671. The 
same act expanded the Fire Court’s authority in other ways; for instance, the court could 
now extend leases by as many as sixty years (fifty-one years in certain cases in which an 
infant held title through an inheritance), see 22 Car II, ch 11, §§ 18, 25 (1670), in 5 Stat-
utes of the Realm 665, 669–70, and it could transfer ownership when street widening ren-
dered a parcel of land too small to be buildable, see 22 Car II, ch 11, § 32 (1670), in 5 
Statutes of the Realm 665, 672. This act established a new sunset date of September 29, 
1671. 22 Car II, ch 11, § 17 (1670), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 665, 669. Parliament subse-
quently extended the court’s sitting until September 29, 1672, adding to the court’s docket 
cases arising from fires in the borough of Southwark. 22 & 23 Car II, ch 14, §§ 1–2 (1671), 
in 5 Statutes of the Realm 724, 724. The court was again unable to conclude its work by 
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As the extensions and expansions of its jurisdiction show, the 
Fire Court came to be regarded as an indispensable institution in 
the rebuilding of London.88 Case by case, over the course of nine 
years and nearly sixteen hundred decrees, it reconfigured parties’ 
legal rights, either reducing rents and extending lease terms to 
give tenants willing to rebuild the financial incentive to do so or 
commanding tenants unwilling to rebuild to surrender their 
leases to willing landlords (sometimes on payment of money to 
help the landlord finance the rebuilding).89 The court’s influence 
 
the deadline; and Parliament revived the Fire Court in 1673 for a final time, in the process 
again extending the jurisdiction to encompass a recent fire that had burned houses left 
standing after the Great Fire. 25 Car II, ch 10 (1673), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 795, 795–
96. The court’s new sunset date was February 25, 1676. 25 Car II, ch 10, § 1 (1673), in 5 
Statutes of the Realm 795, 796. The court heard its last case on February 18, 1676. See 
generally Rookes v Maior of London, I 171 (London Fire Ct Feb 18, 1676). Of the 1,585 
decrees by the Fire Court, 16 involved fires other than the Great Fire. 
 88 See Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 248 (cited in note 37) (“The Fire 
Judges’ Court, by its practice and example, alone made the speedy restoration of London 
possible.”); Reddaway, The Rebuilding of London at 94 (cited in note 37) (“[The Fire Court] 
had the greatest possible success.”). Curiously, despite the Fire Court’s importance, none 
of the standard texts on English legal history mentions the court. See generally Baker, An 
Introduction to English Legal History (cited in note 28); Holdsworth, 1 A History of English 
Law (cited in note 12); Maitland, Equity: Also the Forms of Action at Common Law (cited 
in note 26); S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths 2d 
ed 1981); Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Butterworth 
5th ed 1956). 
 89 For representative cases, see Hickman v Gourney, C 42v, 43–44 (London Fire Ct 
Jan 14, 1668) (forgiving the rental payments from the date of the fire until March 1669, 
extending the lease, originally for thirty-one years at an annual rent of £25, by thirty-five 
years at an annual rent of £12, and further noting the tenant’s argument that the combi-
nation of a widened street and the tenant’s inability to build a jetty over the street made 
it impossible to rebuild a house of the same rental value); Thurlby v Dodsworth, C 38, 38v–
39 (London Fire Ct Jan 8, 1668) (forgiving the tenant’s rental payments from the date of 
the fire until August 1669, extending the lease, originally for twenty-one years at an an-
nual rent of £50 and a fine of £120, by fifty-one years at an annual rent of £62, and further 
requiring the landlord to contribute £400 toward rebuilding); Jeans v Peake, A 341, 341–
42 (London Fire Ct July 18, 1667) (ordering a subtenant to surrender the lease upon the 
landlord’s payment of £30 to the subtenant and noting that, shortly before the fire, the 
subtenant had agreed to pay the prior tenant £300 for the remaining thirty-three years on 
the lease, of which the subtenant had already paid £90); Coates v Withers, A 1, 1 (London 
Fire Ct Feb 27, 1667) (ordering a subtenant to surrender a sublease for a messuage and 
warehouse on the condition that the owner pay £25 to the subtenant, who had recently 
paid £30 to the estate of a prior subtenant for the remaining three-plus years on the sub-
lease). On some occasions, both parties wished to rebuild, and the court needed to deter-
mine which party’s rebuilding plan was more advantageous. The preference was to grant 
the tenant the right. See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xv (cited in note 55) (noting that the 
Fire Court “gave preference to the person in occupation at the time of the Fire”); Kemp v 
Mils, E 127, 127v (London Fire Ct Dec 15, 1668) (holding that “it was not reasonable to 
turne out an old tenant for the benefit of a new contractor”). Sometimes, however, the court 
gave possession to the landlord or owner. See, for example, Altham v Lenthall, A 246, 247 
(London Fire Ct Oct 28, 1667) (holding that, “although a Tenant who desires to build and 
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extended beyond the cases it decided; other cases settled in the 
shadow of the Fire Court’s decrees.90 
B. Critical Features of the London Fire Court 
For present purposes, two features of this remarkable court 
stand out. First, the Fire Court’s procedure was so simple and ef-
ficient that it would be the envy even of modern times. There was 
certainly nothing like it in the seventeenth century. The common-
law courts had become places in which pleading was rigid, draco-
nian, and filled with unforgiving traps for the unwary; their jus-
tice was increasingly slow and expensive.91 Equity was already 
laboriously slow and obscenely expensive, and it was developing 
the rigidity of doctrine associated with common law.92 The Fire 
Court, in contrast, was to proceed “sine forma et figura judicii and 
without the formalities of proceedings in Courts of Law or Eq-
uity.”93 The Fire Court could summon the parties to attend 
 
to returne to the place of his habitaton and trade if hee bee a shoppkeeper who lives by his 
Customers resorting to his shopp ought to be preferred,” the landlord should be given the 
right to rebuild under the unique circumstances of the case). 
 90 See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xix (cited in note 55) (“The decisions of the Court 
. . . influenced other owners of property in the City in dealing with their lessees.”). For 
example, in one case, a tenant who ran a tavern had begun rebuilding pursuant to a prior 
order of the court; his new petition claimed that the landlord and thirteen tenants who 
ran shops beneath the tavern had not joined in the rebuilding or contributed to the cost. 
At the hearing the landlord informed the court that it had already negotiated new terms 
with several of the tenants; the court ordered that it provide like terms to the other tenants 
who wished to rebuild. Sayer v Humble, C 143v, 143v–44v (London Fire Ct Nov 13, 1667). 
 91 See Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 74–77 (cited in note 28) 
(critiquing the technicalities that kept common-law courts from reaching the merits); Donald 
Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640–1660 30–32, 184–93 (Clarendon 1970) 
(same; also discussing reform proposals to reduce delay and expense). 
 92 See notes 75–76 and accompanying text; Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History at 95 (cited in note 28) (noting that, since the seventeenth century, “the word 
‘Chancery’ had been synonymous with expense, delay and despair”); Plucknett, A Concise 
History of the Common Law at 692 (cited in note 88) (describing the increasing rigidity of 
equity doctrine). 
 93 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. A literal 
translation of “sine forma et figura judicii” is “without the form and shape of a judicial 
proceeding.” A looser translation is “in a summary way” or “summarily.” In separate re-
building legislation for London enacted contemporaneously with the Fire Court legisla-
tion, Parliament authorized three common-law judges to determine the value of each per-
son’s interest in property once a jury had determined the overall value of property taken 
for a public purpose. In granting this power, Parliament eschewed the “sine forma et figura 
judicii” language, instead instructing the judges to determine the interests “in a summary 
way of proceeding and without the formalities or ordinary course of proceedings used in” 
the common-law courts. See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8, § 25 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 
603, 608. Likewise, the fire-court legislation arising from the Northampton fire in 1675 
and the Southwark fire in 1676 copied much of the language of the London Fire Court act, 
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through the simple expedient of a note or warrant served after 
the filing of a petition.94 The next step was the hearing on the 
merits; there were no motions to derail the case on technical issues.95 
Three judges heard the case, which was almost always concluded 
on the same day that it commenced; the court typically decided 
three or four cases per day.96 Litigants could, and often did, ap-
pear without counsel.97 There was a right of appeal, but only to a 
larger body of seven or more judges of the same court;98 as might 
 
but substituted the word “summarily” for the phrase “sine forma et figura judicii.” 27 Car 
II, § 1 (1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798; 29 Car II, ch 4, § 1 (1677), in 5 Statutes 
of the Realm 842, 843. 
 94 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 3 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. 
 95 On rare occasion, a party contested the court’s jurisdiction at the hearing on the 
merits. See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xiii (cited in note 55). For instance, in Vandermarsh v 
Godschall, A 141 (London Fire Ct July 5, 1667), the defendant argued that the petitioner, 
who wished to obtain an extension of his lease in return for rebuilding, was a citizen of an 
enemy nation (Holland), and thus unable to hold a lease; he further argued that the dam-
age done to the leased premises did not result from the Great Fire, thus putting the dispute 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Id at 142–44. The court rejected both arguments, after 
which the defendant grudgingly consented to an extension of the lease. Id at 145–46. See 
also Fish v Maior of London, I 27v, 28 (London Fire Ct Dec 5, 1673) (holding that the court 
had jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving a stairway, to be built on a public easement, 
that gave access to rebuilt premises). 
 96 Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xi–xii (cited in note 55). Additional judges might attend 
the hearing. See, for example, Coates, A at 1 (four judges present, with all signing the 
decree); Altham, A at 246–47 (seven judges present, but with only three signing the de-
cree). In the first year, the Fire Court sat on 120 days, and decided 374 cases, averaging 
slightly more than 3 cases per day. See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xi (cited in note 55). See 
also id at xii (“The majority of cases were completed on the day they were called.”). Some-
times the court could not determine the case at the first hearing, and would continue the 
matter. See, for example, Blake v Boulton, A 135, 136 (London Fire Ct May 30, 1667) (de-
tailing two preliminary hearings before the final hearing on the merits). 
 97 The record of each case noted appearances of counsel, if any. In the first case heard 
by the Fire Court, no lawyers were mentioned, see Coates, A at 1; the fifth case was the 
first to mention counsel, who appeared for each side. See Taylor v Brewster, A 8, 8 (London 
Fire Ct May 13, 1667). As might be expected, institutional property owners, such as the 
Cathedral of St. Paul, appeared through lawyers or other agents. See, for example, Kelynge 
v Deane and Chapter of the Cathedrall Church of St. Paul, A 479, 480 (London Fire Ct Apr 
18, 1668) (noting appearances on behalf of both parties). The small cadre of lawyers who 
handled these cases performed a valuable function. See Philip E. Jones, 2 The Fire Court: 
Calendar to the Judgments and Decrees of the Court of Judicature Appointed to Determine 
Differences between Landlords and Tenants as to Rebuilding after the Great Fire. ii (Clowes 
1970) (noting that the number of settlements increased as parties became “aware, or more 
likely were advised by counsel with long experience of the Court[’]s procedure, of the terms 
that would be acceptable to the Court”). 
 98 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, §§ 1, 6 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 601–03. The 
lack of any right of appeal, and in particular of appeal to the House of Lords, was a signif-
icant sticking point that nearly scuttled passage of the Fire Court act. It passed the House 
of Lords after an attempt to include a right of appeal was defeated on a vote of 36–29. 
After passage, three lords specifically registered a formal protest against “the unlimited 
and unbounded Power given to the Judges in this Bill without any Appeal.” See 12 HL J 
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therefore be expected, appeals were rare and uniformly unsuc-
cessful.99 The judges were barred from accepting fees for their ser-
vices, at a time when fees were a major source of judicial income.100 
Second, Parliament generally left the decision to use juries to 
the discretion of the court.101 Out of the 1,585 cases that the London 
Fire Court decided, the records reflect only 1 case in which the 
Fire Court referred a matter to a jury. Drewry v FitzGerrald102 in-
volved a dispute over the value of a scrap of land that was too 
small to build on and that a neighbor, John Drewry, had used to 
build a bigger house for himself.103 While the court could adjust 
 
86–87 (Jan 23, 1667). The act had no comparable difficulty in the House of Commons, 
passing without significant debate. See 8 HC J 687 (Jan 31, 1667). 
 99 Of the Fire Court’s 1,585 decrees, 8 were appeals from prior decisions of the court. 
No appeal was successful. See generally Master List of Fire Court Decrees (cited in note 
40). See also note 40. 
 100 Compare 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 4 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602 
(“[N]one of the said Justices And Barons shall take any Fee or Reward whatsoever directly 
or indirectly for any thing to be done by them by vertue or colour of this present Act.”), 
with Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law at 252–55 (cited in note 12) (discussing fees 
typically received by common-law judges). 
 101 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602 (stating that 
the court “may upon the verdict or inquisition of Jurors testimony of witnesses upon oath, 
Examination of partyes interessed, or by all or any of the said wayes or otherwise accord-
ing to their Discretions proceede to the hearing and determining of the Demands or Dif-
ferences betweene the said Partyes”). The lack of a comma after “Jurors” is either a draft-
ing error or a drafting convention of the time. Legislation that created some of the other 
fire courts recited a comparable formula but included the comma. See 27 Car II, § 1 (1675), 
in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798 (allowing the Northampton Fire Court to proceed “by 
Verdict, Testimony of Wittnesses upon Oath, Examination of Parties interested or by all 
or any of the said wayes or otherwise at their discretions”); 5 Geo II, ch 16 (1731) (on file 
with author) (allowing the Blandford Fire Court to proceed “either by Verdict or Inquisi-
tion of Jurors, Testimony of Witnesses upon Oath, Examination of Parties interested, or 
by all or any of the said Ways, or otherwise, at their Discretions”). The formulation for the 
Wareham Fire Court act was identical to that of the Blandford Fire Court act, see 3 Geo 
III, ch 54 (1762) (on file with author), and the Chudleigh Fire Court act was essentially 
identical, see 48 Geo III, ch 89 (1808) (on file with author). On the other hand, the Southwark 
Fire Court act had no comma after “Verdict” and did not mention “jurors” at all in the 
equivalent clause. See 29 Car II, ch 4, § 1 (1677), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 842, 843 
(allowing the court to proceed “by Verdict Testimony of Wittnesses upon Oath Examina-
tion of partyes interessed or by all or any of the said wayes or otherwise at their discre-
tions”). The Tiverton Fire Court act followed the Southwark formula, but inserted a comma 
after “Verdict” and made other inconsequential changes. See 5 Geo II, ch 14 (1731) (on file 
with author). The Warwick statute followed the London Fire Court act formula, but it had 
no commas between any of its clauses and modernized the spelling of “Interested.” See 6 & 
7 Wm & Mary (1694) (private act) (on file with author). 
 102 I 76 (London Fire Ct May 12 and July 14, 1674). 
 103 Id at 76–76v. Drewry held a fifty-year lease on property on Fleet Lane, while Richard 
FitzGerrald held the adjoining scrap of ground under a lease that lasted another twenty-
seven years. Claiming a half-interest in Drewry’s house, FitzGerrald brought an action of 
ejectment; in response Drewry petitioned the Fire Court to transfer possession of the land 
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lease terms, its enabling statute gave it no authority to determine 
the value of land taken in such circumstances; Parliament re-
quired that task to be performed by a jury impaneled by the lord 
mayor of London and the Court of Aldermen.104 After the jury re-
turned its verdict on the value of the land taken by Drewry, the 
case went back to the Fire Court, which confirmed the jury’s ver-
dict and ordered transfer of the neighbor’s lease to Drewry on 
Drewry’s payment of the jury’s award.105 
Even when a jury impaneled by the mayor and Court of 
Aldermen rendered a property valuation, the Fire Court was not 
required to accept its findings. In Ford v Salter,106 a jury had pre-
viously valued land taken for an expansion of the Navy Office.107 
Different parties held interests in the property, and one party dis-
satisfied with the amount that the jury awarded for his share filed 
a petition in the Fire Court to increase his award. The court ac-
cepted the jury’s finding on the value of the taken land (£3,023 
13s).108 On intricate facts, it then held that the value of the peti-
tioner’s interest was £400 rather than the £300 that the jury 
awarded.109 
So far as the records show, in no case did the Fire Court im-
panel a jury to aid in its decisionmaking on matters within the 
Fire Court’s jurisdiction. Of course, it is possible that juries were 
 
to Drewry for the remainder of his lease. The court referred two questions to a jury impaneled 
by the lord mayor of London and the Court of Aldermen: first, whether FitzGerrald’s scrap 
of land was too small to build on; and second, if it was, what the value of the land was. The 
jury found that the land was too small to support a building, that the value of FitzGerrald’s 
interest for the remainder of his twenty-seven-year lease was £33, and that the value of 
the interest of FitzGerrald’s landlord (between the expiration of FitzGerrald’s lease and 
the expiration of Drewry’s lease) was £9. Id at 76–78v. 
 104 The power of the Fire Court to order these transfers of land, as well as the require-
ment that the value of transferred land be determined by a jury impaneled by the mayor 
and aldermen, were both added in the 1670 statute reauthorizing the Fire Court. 22 Car 
II, ch 11, § 32 (1670), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 665, 672. Before the 1670 reauthorization, 
Parliament had kept the function of the Fire Court in adjusting lease terms and the just 
compensation function more distinct; other rebuilding legislation allocated responsibility 
over the latter function exclusively to the lord mayor and the Court of Aldermen. See 18 
& 19 Car II, ch 8, § 23 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 608. 
 105 Drewry, I at 78–79v. 
 106 I 137 (London Fire Ct Feb 2, May 1, and Nov 13, 1675). In the statute for rebuilding 
London, which was a statute distinct from the legislation erecting the Fire Court, Parlia-
ment gave “three or more” of the common-law judges the power to resolve disputes over 
different interests in property taken for public use and to distribute a jury award among 
those interests. See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8, § 25 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 608. 
Ford was a rare case invoking this power. See generally Ford, I 137. 
 107 Ford, I at 137v–38. 
 108 Id at 138. 
 109 Id at 140v. 
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employed in cases before the Fire Court without the fact being 
noted in the court’s records. But this scenario is unlikely. The 
scribe recording the court’s decrees spelled out in detail the pro-
cedural aspects of each case: the allegations in the petition, the 
service on the defendants, the appearances of counsel, prior hear-
ings, the appearances of witnesses, the evidence adduced, and the 
orders that the court issued. Failing to mention a critical element 
like a jury verdict would not have been in keeping with this level 
of detail, especially given the scribe’s painstaking, one-and-one-
half-page rendering of the jury’s verdict in Drewry.110 
Certain realities temper the striking lack of juries. In most of 
the cases heard by the Fire Court, the parties came to a settle-
ment, with the court either mediating the parties’ dispute or ap-
proving the parties’ prepackaged deal.111 Most contested cases in-
volved limited factual disputes: the terms of the leases and the 
ownership interests in the property were usually undisputed, and 
often the only issues were who would rebuild and on what terms. 
When factual disputes arose, they often occurred in cases that we 
would regard as equitable rather than legal: the Fire Court’s prin-
cipal task was not to award damages for past arrears of rent but 
to adjust the terms of the lease going forward.112 Despite these 
limits, however, the court almost invariably excused past arrear-
ages. Moreover, it sometimes made factual determinations in 
cases that would have been heard at common law—and per-
formed the task without a jury. For instance, in Lamot v Major of 
London,113 the parties negotiated a new lease for fifty-one years. 
The tenant believed that the new agreement absolved him from 
paying all arrears of rent; the City claimed that he had agreed to 
 
 110 See Drewry, I at 78–78v. 
 111 See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at xvi (cited in note 55) (“The Court continually medi-
ated between the parties to settle terms upon which one of them would rebuild.”); Jones, 
2 The Fire Court at ii (cited in note 97) (“The principal difference between the cases recorded 
in the present Calendar and [earlier cases] is the frequency with which the parties re-
ported that they had reached agreement prior to the hearing.”). 
 112 For instance, Vandermarsh involved factual disputes about the citizenship of the 
petitioner and the extent of damage to his property, but the petitioner was seeking only 
an extension of his present lease. See Vandermarsh, A at 142 (praying that the Fire Court 
grant “[such] releife as should seeme meet and to stand with just right equity and good 
Conscience”). On occasion the court referred to the possibility that the parties might resort 
to common-law courts either to litigate issues not decided in the case or to enforce their 
legal rights if a party failed to abide by the terms of the court’s decree. See, for example, 
Altham, A at 247 (permitting an owner to demand arrears “according to Law” from a ten-
ant whose proposal to rebuild was rejected in favor of the owner’s). 
 113 H 241 (London Fire Ct Sept 26, 1672). 
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pay arrears. The Fire Court received evidence and heard the par-
ties. The court credited the plaintiff, but still split the difference: 
it required the tenant to pay arrears up to the Great Fire, and 
discharged the tenant for postfire arrears.114 
The Fire Court’s failure to use juries is understandable. The 
court’s powers to reduce rents and extend leases went far beyond 
the authority of common-law courts to order ejectment or to 
award damages for arrearages or breaches of the covenant of re-
pair. The Fire Court was also not a court of equity: it operated not 
according to principles of equity, but according to Parliament’s 
command to distribute losses proportionally and to craft leasing 
arrangements that financed the speedy rebuilding of London.115 
Although equity could relieve a tenant from the harshness of a 
legal remedy by canceling a lease and forgiving back rent,116 it did 
not have the Fire Court’s power to force the parties to accept a 
new lease of a different length and for a different rent. In modern 
parlance, we might say that the Fire Court operated in the spirit 
of equity, merging elements of law and equity; but this description 
would have meant little to judges operating in a world of distinct 
court systems and few enforceable statutory rights. One thing, 
however, was clear: the Fire Court was not a common-law court.117 
And jury trial was confined to common-law courts.118 
 
 114 Id at 242. See also 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 
602 (limiting the Fire Court’s power to apportion or abate arrearages in rents to those that 
arose after the Great Fire). 
 115 See notes 87–89 and accompanying text; Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 
245 (cited in note 37) (describing the Fire Court act as “daringly conceived, undermining 
all those sacred rights with which lawyers during past centuries had invested property, 
accepted and passed by a Parliament in which property alone was represented”). 
 116 See note 75 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Jones, 1 The Fire Court at vi (cited in note 55) (stating that, although the 
judges came from the common-law courts, the Fire Court’s “procedure and jurisdiction 
[were] akin to a court of Equity”). Walter George Bell may have put the matter best: 
The Court sat in equity, but differed from all known courts in this, that in addi-
tion to the parties before it there was a third party, whose interests were con-
fided to the safekeeping of the Judges themselves. This was the public, and in 
case after case the public interest in the speedy rebuilding of [ ] the City decided 
the issue. 
Bell, The Great Fire of London in 1666 at 246 (cited in note 37). 
 118 In addition, juries were under attack in the mid-1660s due to concerns about brib-
ery and delay. See William Holdsworth, 6 A History of English Law 408–09 (Methuen 2d ed 
1977) (describing reforms to the jury system in the mid- to late seventeenth century to 
prevent corrupt and dilatory practices). The common-law justices serving on the Fire 
Court would have been intimately aware of the failings of jury trial. 
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C. Subsequent Fire Courts 
The London Fire Court was no flash in the pan. Large urban 
fires continued to plague England into the nineteenth century. 
Parliament established courts of judicature to deal with the 
Northampton fire in 1675, the Southwark fire in 1676, the Warwick 
fire in 1694, the Tiverton and Blandford fires in 1731, the Wareham 
fire in 1762, and the Chudleigh fire in 1807.119 Although built on 
the London model, later fire legislation differed from the London 
legislation in important details. First, the later legislation tended 
to construct a single court with vaster powers: in some ways the 
latter fire courts took a mien of an administrative agency per-
forming both rulemaking and adjudicatory functions. For in-
stance, the later courts had the ability to establish regulations for 
new buildings, a power that Parliament had exercised for London.120 
Later courts also had the power both to determine landlord-tenant 
disputes and to impanel juries to determine proper compensation 
for landowners whose property was taken or reduced in value as 
a result of rebuilding—tasks that, as we have seen, Parliament 
had divided between the judges of the London Fire Court on the 
one hand and London’s lord mayor and Court of Aldermen on the 
other.121 Second, the common-law judges essentially dropped out 
 
 119 See note 42. Despite pressure to do so, Parliament failed to enact a statute to deal 
with a fire in Buckingham in 1724, much to the detriment of the town. See Sharman, The 
Northampton Fire Court at 125 (cited in note 42). 
 120 See note 58 and accompanying text. 
 121 See note 104 and accompanying text. For the rebuilding of London, Parliament 
had initially enacted two statutes: one to erect the Fire Court and another to establish 
regulations for rebuilding. See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 
601–03 (Fire Court legislation); 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 
603–12 (rebuilding legislation). The rebuilding legislation required London’s lord mayor 
and Court of Aldermen to impanel juries: (1) to determine the value of land that was seized 
because no one was willing to rebuild on it after a period of three years, see 18 & 19 Car 
II, ch 8, § 13 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 605; (2) to determine the value of land 
taken for street widening if the owner would not agree to a price, 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8, § 23 
(1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 605; and (3) to determine the amounts that owners 
whose land was improved by rebuilding should pay to the City of London as a result of 
their new advantage, see 18 & 19 Car II, ch 8, § 24 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 603, 
608. In the later fire legislation, Parliament combined all the tasks in one statute, and 
then concentrated all the regulatory and adjudicatory powers in one body: the fire court. 
When land valuation was in issue, Parliament required these courts to use juries. See, for 
example, 27 Car II, § 4 (1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 799 (requiring a jury to 
assess the value of any land that the Northampton Fire Court ordered taken from a land-
owner for rebuilding purposes); 29 Car II, ch 4, § 4 (1677), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 842, 
843–44 (requiring a jury to determine the value of land taken when the Southwark Fire 
Court ordered the confiscation of land due to a landowner’s failure to rebuild); 48 Geo III, 
ch 89, §§ 7, 15 (1808) (on file with author) (requiring the Chudleigh Fire Court to impanel 
a jury to determine the value of land taken for street widening and further requiring a 
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of the picture with subsequent fire courts. The legislation for 
Northampton and Southwark included the common-law judges 
among those who could hear cases, but added local judges and dig-
nitaries to the list of eligible court members.122 The records of the 
Southwark Fire Court reflect that, while at least one justice sat 
on each of the fifty-two cases heard, only seven of the twelve 
common-law justices ever sat to hear a case, and only three of 
these sat with regularity.123 By the time of the Chudleigh fire in 
1807, local dignitaries constituted the court; no mention was 
made of the common-law judges.124 
With these alterations in form, Parliament relied on the fire 
courts to resolve legal disputes arising from urban fires.125 With 
 
jury to determine the value of the interest in land that was seized when a person was 
unwilling to pay an appropriate share of rebuilding expenses incurred by other parties). 
 122 See 27 Car II, § 1 (1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798 (Northampton); 29 
Car II, ch 4, § 1 (1677), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 842, 842–43 (Southwark). 
 123 See generally Court of Judicature Decrees, Fire of Southwark (1677) (copy from the 
London Metropolitan Archives on file with author). See also Sharman, The Northampton 
Fire Court at 121 (cited in note 42) (noting that “[n]one of the judges of the royal courts 
ever sat” on the Northampton Fire Court). 
 124 See 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 1 (1808) (on file with author) (noting also that the officials 
charged with resolving disputes in the Chudleigh fire were called “[c]ommissioners”). 
 125 Sometimes Parliament required the later fire courts to resolve disputes under a 
proportional-share-of-the-loss standard equivalent to the London Fire Court’s standard, 
see note 87 and accompanying text; sometimes it did not. Compare 29 Car II, ch 4, § 1 
(1677), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 842, 842 (specifying the London Fire Court’s standard 
of “proportionable share in the losse according to their severall Interests” for the Southwark 
fire), with 27 Car II (1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798–801 (not specifying a 
standard for the Northampton Fire Court), and 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 1 (1808) (on file with 
author) (not specifying a standard for the Chudleigh Fire Court). Nonetheless, every fire 
court received the powers to modify the length and terms of leases and to excuse covenants 
and postfire arrearages of rent—powers that were the means by which the courts achieved 
proportional sharing. Indeed, the Chudleigh court’s power to settle disputes concerning 
rents, covenants, or “any Rate or Contribution to be borne or paid for and towards the 
repairing and rebuilding of said Houses, by any Person or Persons,” 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 1 
(1808) (on file with author), and to adjust the terms of leases was in some ways more open-
ended than that of the London Fire Court: the Chudleigh court was unrestricted in the 
length of a new lease that it could establish. Compare Geo III, ch 89, § 3 (1808) (on file 
with author) (empowering the Chudleigh court to order “the granting, enlarging, charging, 
abridging, exchanging, surrendering, or determining of any Estates in the Premises”), 
with 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 2 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602 (limiting the 
power of the London Fire Court to extend a lease to forty years), and 22 Car II, ch 11, § 18 
(1670), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 665, 669 (increasing the London Fire Court’s power to 
extend leases to sixty years). 
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various formulations, each of the statutes gave the courts the dis-
cretion to use juries,126 with mandatory impaneling of juries re-
quired only for issues of property valuation.127 Not all of the records 
of these courts survive, but those that do suggest that the courts 
did not generally employ juries. The records of the Southwark 
Fire Court reveal that, like the London Fire Court, the Southwark 
court never relied on juries to determine disputed factual mat-
ters.128 According to a historian who examined the records of the 
Northampton Fire Court, juries were impaneled only to value 
land taken from its owner in the rebuilding process129—exactly 
the same purpose for which they had been used in London.130 The 
one and only counterexample that I have found occurred when the 
Warwick Fire Court impaneled a jury to determine who had 
pulled down a house to stop the progress of the fire (unnecessarily, 
as it turned out) and what the amount of the homeowner’s dam-
age was; but even in this case the court weighed the evidence and 
jury verdict before determining these facts for itself.131 As a rule 
(to which land-valuation issues were the exception), Parliament 
and the fire-court judges saw juries as a dispensable feature in 
the resolution of legal problems arising from these urban catas-
trophes. 
II.  INTERPRETING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN LIGHT OF THE 
FIRE COURTS 
As we have seen, the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial right 
hinges substantially on the allocation of fact-finding between 
 
 126 See note 101. 
 127 With later statutes, the juries were impaneled directly by the fire court, not by 
other officials such as the town’s mayor or aldermen. See, for example, 27 Car II, § 4 (1675), 
in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 799 (Northampton); 6 & 7 Wm & Mary, 4 (1694) (private 
act) (Warwick) (on file with author). 
 128 As with the London Fire Court, see note 112 and accompanying text, not every 
case before the Southwark Fire Court involved factual disputes. When such disputes arose, 
however, the court resolved them without the aid of a jury. See, for example, Bankes v 
Wight (Southwark Fire Ct June 8, 1677), in Court of Judicature Decrees, Fire of Southwark 
6, 7–8 (1677) (copy from the London Metropolitan Archives on file with author) (describing 
testimony given under oath about the terms and covenants of a lease). 
 129 See Sharman, The Northampton Fire Court at 123 (cited in note 42). 
 130 See notes 104, 121, and accompanying text. 
 131 See Decree for Edward Heath (Warwick Fire Ct), in Farr, ed, The Great Fire of 
Warwick 1694 374, 374–76 (cited in note 42). The court’s judgment in Heath agreed with 
the jury’s verdict. The Warwick court also impaneled a jury in a second case involving the 
valuation of a life interest when the court transferred possession of the land to a third 
party. See Decree for Edward Clopton of Bridgetown, Esq (Warwick Fire Ct), in Farr, ed, 
The Great Fire of Warwick 1694 396, 396–97 (cited in note 42).  
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judge and jury in late eighteenth-century England.132 If the Par-
liament of that era could grant judges the discretion not to im-
panel juries, and if judges in the exercise of that discretion chose 
not to impanel juries, then federal judges today may enjoy some 
power under the Seventh Amendment not to impanel civil juries. 
Whether such a power exists, however, depends on two issues. 
The first is one of scope: Assuming that the history of the fire 
courts determines the question, how much license does this his-
tory give to federal judges to strike civil juries? The second issue 
is normative: Assuming that the history of the fire courts gives 
some license to strike juries, may judges employ this power given 
our settled understanding of the breadth of the Seventh 
Amendment’s jury trial right? This Part addresses the first issue; 
the Conclusion addresses the second. 
A. The Breadth of the Exception to the Right to Jury Trial 
On the assumption that history determines (or at least 
strongly influences) the scope of the modern jury trial right, the 
history of the fire courts lends itself to three interpretations: a 
broad reading, in which judges can suspend jury trial whenever 
it is expedient to do so; a narrow reading, in which the history of 
the fire courts has no influence on the modern use of jury trials; 
and an intermediate reading, in which the power to strike civil 
juries is confined to circumstances of the kind that led Parliament 
to create the fire courts. The historical record best supports the 
intermediate position. 
To begin, the broad interpretation of the fire-court history—
that the existence of the fire courts provides a power for judges to 
suspend jury trial whenever in their discretion it seems proper to 
do so—is too extravagant a theory to maintain in view of the scope 
of the fire courts’ operation. Unlike many lawsuits, the fire-court 
cases had a limited need for fact-finding, which is the grist of a 
jury’s mill. Although the courts had factual findings to make (for 
instance, determining the terms of the lease(s) involved in the dis-
pute), in most cases they had very few (if any) factual disputes to 
resolve. Relatedly, most of the fire-court cases for which records 
exist in accessible form (London, Southwark, and Warwick) were 
arbitrated or voluntarily settled. Even when these disputes were 
litigated and factual disputes resolved, the remedies were pre-
dominantly equitable in nature (or, perhaps more accurately, 
 
 132 See notes 8–36 and accompanying text. 
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were unavailable at common law): when the tenant was willing to 
rebuild, the London Fire Court usually forgave rent in arrears, 
excused the nonperformance of the covenant to rebuild, and ex-
tended and modified lease terms. None of these remedies was 
available at law, which would have enforced contracts and cove-
nants according to their letter.133 Moreover, the fire courts were 
ad hoc tribunals, legislatively constructed for a specific purpose 
and applying law tailored to the situation. Finally, fire courts con-
structed after the London Fire Court were not purely adjudicatory 
bodies, but also had administrative responsibilities of a kind to 
which a right to jury trial has never extended.134 In short, to erect 
a broad theory of jury abrogation from the history of a unique, 
constrained, and occasional court would let a small tail wag a 
large dog. 
The opposing theory—that the history of the fire courts 
should not influence the present interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment at all—presents a more substantial hurdle. The ar-
gument runs along these lines. The right to a civil jury is deter-
mined principally by two factors: historical practice in 1791 and 
the nature of the relief sought.135 In some cases, however, a third 
factor comes into play: “the practical abilities and limitations of 
juries.”136 The Supreme Court has explained that this third factor 
applies to cases in which “Congress has permissibly entrusted the 
resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or spe-
cialized court of equity, and [in which] jury trials would impair 
the functioning of the legislative scheme.”137 Congress’s power to 
abrogate jury trial for these disputes extends only to cases involv-
ing “public rights.”138 “Public rights” are implicated in two narrow 
categories: claims against the government and claims in which 
 
 133 See notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
 134 See note 121 and accompanying text (describing the rulemaking responsibilities of 
the later fire courts). The Seventh Amendment does not apply to administrative rulemaking. 
See Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 Vand L 
Rev 1747, 1756–57 (1998) (contrasting administrative rulemaking with jury trial as a 
means to determine liability). 
 135 See notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
 136 Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531, 538 n 10 (1970). 
 137 Granfinanciera, SA v Nordberg, 492 US 33, 42 n 4 (1989). 
 138 Id at 51 (“Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights free 
from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns their adjudication to tribunals 
without statutory authority to employ juries as factfinders.”). See also Atlas Roofing Co v 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 US 442, 455 (1977) (“[W]hen 
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an ad-
ministrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the 
Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’”). 
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“Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its 
constitutional powers under Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly 
‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory 
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with 
limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”139 The fire courts 
fell into the latter bucket of “public rights”: they were closely in-
tegrated into public regulatory schemes for rebuilding burned cit-
ies. Thus, the argument concludes, the existing analytical struc-
ture for the Seventh Amendment already accounts for entities 
such as the fire courts, and no new exception or alteration in doc-
trine needs to be made. 
But this argument fails. The fire courts were not courts of 
equity,140 nor were they administrative agencies, when they adju-
dicated the rights of landlords and tenants. Even granting that 
later fire courts had regulatory as well as adjudicatory responsi-
bilities and that these courts included local dignitaries in addition 
to judges,141 the London Fire Court could in no way be seen as an 
administrative agency. The judges of the London Fire Court were 
the common-law judges—as close a parallel to Article III judges 
as could be found in seventeenth-century England. Moreover, in-
sofar as they adjudicated the rights of private parties, none of the 
fire courts was an administrative agency: on the contrary, Parlia-
ment constituted the London Fire Court, and each later fire court, 
as “a Court of Record.”142 Although some features of these later fire 
 
 139 Granfinanciera, 492 US at 54, quoting Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products Co, 473 US 568, 593–94 (1985) (brackets in original). 
 140 See notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 141 See notes 120–24 and accompanying text. The very last fire court took on the mien 
of an administrative agency in another way: the right of appeal. For the London Fire Court 
in 1666, Parliament had permitted an appeal from the court’s “Judgments and Determi-
nations” only to a larger body of the same court. See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 4 (1667), in 5 
Statutes of the Realm 601, 602. See also note 98 and accompanying text. For the Chudleigh 
Fire Court in 1808, Parliament provided a right of appeal to the court of assize for the 
County of Devon. See 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 26 (1808) (on file with author). The right to 
judicial review of agency action is a common feature of modern administrative law. See 
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat 237, 243 (1946), codified as amended at 5 USC 
§ 702 (“Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 142 See 18 & 19 Car II, ch 7, § 4 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 602 (stating 
that “the said Justices and Barons or any three of them for the matters and according to 
the powers herein before mentioned shall be, and shall be taken to be a Court of Record”). 
The same language was used in later fire-court statutes. See, for example, 27 Car II, § 1 
(1675), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 798, 798 (constituting the Northampton Fire Court as a 
“Court of Record”); 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 1 (1808) (on file with author) (constituting the 
Chudleigh Fire Court as a “Court of Record”). A “court of record is that where the acts and 
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courts, seen in retrospect, make them look like proto–administrative 
agencies,143 a nonanachronistic view must acknowledge that they 
were—and were understood at the time to be—judicial bodies 
when they adjudicated the contractual rights of landlords and 
tenants. Any effort to cabin the fire courts within the “public 
rights” corner of Seventh Amendment doctrine fails to come to 
terms with the courts’ true nature. 
Another reason that the fire courts cannot be swept into the 
“public rights” corner of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is 
that the “practical abilities and limitations” factor limits jury trial 
only when the first two factors—the scope of jury trial in 1791 and 
the nature of the relief sought—point toward jury trial. As the 
history of the fire courts shows, Parliament’s ability to suspend 
jury trial for disputes arising from catastrophic harm was an es-
tablished practice in 1791.144 Because the fire courts’ influence on 
 
judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony: 
which rolls are called the records of the court, and are of such high and supereminent au-
thority, that their truth is not to be called in question.” Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 24 
(cited in note 74). See also id (“All courts of record are the king’s courts, in right of his 
crown and royal dignity.”). There were numerous courts of record in seventeenth-century 
England, including the common-law courts and a number of minor courts, such as the 
Court of Oyer and Terminer, the Court of Gaol Delivery, and the Court of Sewers. See 
Gregory’s Case, 77 Eng Rep 282, 284 (KB 1595). Nineteenth-century reforms consolidated 
many of these courts into the High Court of Justice. See Holdsworth, 1 A History of English 
Law at 639 (cited in note 12). 
 143 See, for example, Frank A. Sharman, Planning Law after the Great Fire of London, 
J Planning & Envir L 24, 26 (1982) (noting that the power given by Parliament to the City 
of London for rebuilding the City was “a very complete system of planning law containing 
forerunners of many modern planning law provisions”). 
 144 It is unclear whether the fire courts were in Alexander Hamilton’s mind when he 
wrote Federalist 83, which defended the Constitution’s failure to include a right to civil 
jury trial. In the course of arguing that any attempt to delineate the scope of civil jury trial 
by constitutional provision would be unwise because of unforeseeable developments in the 
law, Hamilton observed: 
It is conceded by all reasonable men, that [jury trial] ought not to obtain in all 
cases. The examples of innovations which contract its ancient limits, as well in 
these states as in Great-Britain, afford a strong presumption that its former ex-
tent has been found inconvenient; and give room to suppose that future experi-
ence may discover the propriety and utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be 
impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at which the oper-
ation of the institution ought to stop; and this is with me a strong argument for 
leaving the matter to the discretion of the legislature. 
 This is now clearly understood to be the case in Great-Britain, and it is 
equally so in the state of Connecticut. 
Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 558, 573–74 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, 
ed). See also Bruce A. Ragsdale, ed, 1 Debates on the Federal Judiciary: A Documentary 
 1928  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1893 
   
the Seventh Amendment inquiry does not travel through the 
Amendment’s “practical abilities and limitations” prong, the 
“public rights” analysis of that prong does not control the extent 
of the fire courts’ influence on the right to jury trial.145 
In steering between the Charybdis of “broad influence” and 
the Scylla of “no influence,” however, the impact of the fire courts 
on the scope of the modern power to suspend civil juries in federal 
court remains an open question. Does this history allow Congress 
to suspend juries only for landlord-tenant disputes arising from 
catastrophic urban fires (which, given the dearth of such fires today, 
would effectively render the history irrelevant)? This stingy read-
ing is unduly narrow. Cases interpreting the Seventh Amendment 
look to history not for a precise matching of factual and legal cir-
cumstances but for the best historical analogue; in the process, 
there is some abstraction from the particular setting under which 
jury trial did, or did not, occur in 1791.146 On the other hand, ab-
stracting too much from the particulars of the fire-court history—
for example, by saying that because the fire courts resolved civil 
rather than criminal disputes, the fire-court history allows abro-
gation of jury trial in all civil cases—fails to respect the unique 
circumstances that led Parliament to create a limited discretion 
to abrogate jury trial.147 
History, structure, and precedent are useful aids in finding 
the right level of abstraction.148 With respect to history, the salient 
features of an exception to jury trial must account for Parlia-
ment’s motivation in establishing the fire courts as well as the 
 
History 45 (Federal Judicial Center 2013) (suggesting the Hamilton was referring to “ex-
periments in Great Britain and in some states that allowed other court procedures for 
settling property disputes”). 
 145 At the same time, this exception can help to shape the breadth of the limitation on 
jury trial. See notes 144, 172, 195, and accompanying text. 
 146 For instance, in Chauffeurs, which involved whether a jury should hear a case 
involving a union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation, the majority and dis-
senting opinions examined the best available analogues from 1791—an attorney malprac-
tice action and a breach of fiduciary duty suit—in exploring the jury trial right, even 
though the factual and legal circumstances of a fair representation case varied from both 
analogues. See note 31. The Supreme Court also abstracts from historical practice in other 
constitutional contexts. See, for example, District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 582 
(2008) (characterizing as “bordering on the frivolous” the argument that the only arms 
protected by the Second Amendment were those in existence at the time of the Amend-
ment’s ratification). 
 147 See notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 148 See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 713 (1999) (interpreting the Eleventh 
Amendment in accordance with “the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the author-
itative interpretations by this Court”). 
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episodic nature of these courts in English practice. These features 
should be stated in a general enough fashion that they remain 
applicable in modern times149 but are nonetheless fairly specific.150 
With respect to structural considerations, juries are a check 
against overreaching by government;151 therefore, any limitations 
on the right should be narrow and necessary,152 and ideally should 
require the assent of multiple branches of government.153 With re-
spect to precedent, the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence is rich and stable; any exception to jury trial should fit gen-
erally within the Court’s framework, which examines not only 
history but also “the remedy sought” and the narrow “public 
 
 149 See Heller, 554 US at 582, 627, quoting United States v Miller, 307 US 174, 179 
(1939) (refusing to limit the Second Amendment’s “right to keep and carry arms” to the 
exact weapons available at the time of the Amendment’s ratification and holding instead 
that the right was limited to “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time’”). 
 150 The level-of-generality problem is common in constitutional analysis, and is often 
resolved by tailoring constitutional arguments at a more specific level. For example, in 
Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635 (1987), the plaintiffs alleged that government officials 
violated their constitutional rights. To prevail, they needed to show that the constitutional 
right that the officials allegedly violated was a clearly established rule of constitutional law. 
Id at 639. As the Court observed: 
The operation of this standard [ ] depends substantially upon the level of gener-
ality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified. . . . [O]ur cases estab-
lish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly 
established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The con-
tours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates that right. 
Id at 639–40. See also R.A.V. v City of St Paul, Minnesota, 505 US 377, 383 (1992) (stating 
that the Court has adopted a “limited categorical approach” to exempt some speech from 
First Amendment protection, and noting that recent decisions “have narrowed the scope 
of the traditional categorical exceptions”); id at 428 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that “we have consistently construed the ‘fighting words’ exception . . . narrowly”). 
 151 See Federalist 83 at 562 (cited in note 144) (describing two views held by support-
ers and opponents of the Constitution about jury trial, with “the former regard[ing] it as a 
valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent[ing] it as the very palladium of free 
government”). See also Wellness International Network, Ltd v Sharif, 135 S Ct 1932, 1961 
n 1 (2015) (Thomas dissenting), quoting Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296, 306 (2004) 
(“There is some dispute whether the guarantee of a jury trial protects an individual right, 
a structural right, or both. . . . My view . . . leaves no doubt: It is a ‘fundamental reserva-
tion of power in our constitutional structure.’”). 
 152 See Granfinanciera, 492 US at 42 n 4, 54 (noting that Congress may abrogate the 
right to jury trial in private cases by enacting legislation that establishes a regulatory 
regime, but only when jury trial would frustrate the objectives of this regime). See also 
Heller, 554 US at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is 
not unlimited.”). 
 153 See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L J 1029, 1030, 1045–
56 (2004) (arguing for “a more hard-headed doctrine—one that allows short-term emer-
gency measures but draws the line against permanent restrictions” on civil liberties and 
further arguing that any emergency measures should contain political checks and balances). 
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rights” exception to jury trial.154 These latter two factors can also 
help to identify features of the fire-court history out of which a 
fact-specific exception to jury trial can be built. 
In light of these considerations, the history of the fire courts 
suggests that jury trial in federal court may be limited when four 
features are present: (1) a significant political, economic, or social 
crisis; (2) legal disputes arising out of this crisis that, if adjudi-
cated under the legal system’s ordinary rules of substantive, pro-
cedural, and remedial law, impose an obstacle to a socially desir-
able activity necessary to resolve the crisis expeditiously; (3) an 
act of Congress that creates a tailored substantive, procedural, 
and remedial scheme that is intended to resolve disputes in a way 
that promotes the desired activity; and (4) statutory delegation to 
Article III judges of the power to strike juries when jury trial 
would thwart the effective administration of this scheme.155 
The first factor—a significant crisis—acknowledges the na-
tional or regional catastrophes that urban fires once created. It 
also recognizes the episodic nature of the fire courts; abrogating 
jury trial should not be a permissible option under the Seventh 
Amendment for common or recurring types of legal disputes. The 
second factor—the unresponsiveness of ordinary legal rules to the 
crisis—also keys into the historical circumstances that gave rise 
to the fire courts. The common law of the period would have rig-
idly allocated the entire loss to one side or the other (likely the 
tenants); and, assuming that the chancellor was sympathetic to 
the plight of the losing tenants, all that equity could have done 
would have been to throw the entirety of the loss onto the land-
lords.156 Neither result would have addressed the fundamental social 
need—to rebuild a city as quickly as possible. Given the way in 
which land development was financed (favorable lease terms to 
tenants to induce them to build),157 the only way to spur the re-
building of burned areas was to lower rents and extend lease 
terms to the point that tenants found it profitable to rebuild. But 
 
 154 See Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565 & n 4 (describing history, remedy, and the “public 
rights” exception as the three factors in the Seventh Amendment analysis); Granfinanciera, 
492 US at 42 & n 4 (same). 
 155 I assume that Congress has authority under Article I to enact such legislation and 
that Article III courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over the disputes and personal ju-
risdiction over the parties. 
 156 See notes 60–75, 91–92, 116, and accompanying text. 
 157 See notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
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the rigid substantive and remedial law of the time could not ac-
commodate this Solomonic solution; and in any event the proce-
dural law would have kept the cases tied up in litigation for years. 
The existence of legal obstacles in the wake of a crisis should 
not, however, be a sufficient reason to suspend jury trial; other-
wise, jury trial rights would always be subject to suspension in 
times of emergency. Hence the third and fourth factors: Congress 
must craft a legal regime designed to foster activity that aids re-
covery from the crisis; and jury trial must be incompatible with 
this regulatory regime—an incompatibility that the legislation re-
solves by giving judges the discretion to suspend jury trial if nec-
essary to implement the regime effectively. 
Like the first two factors, the third and fourth factors draw 
substantially on the historical circumstances that gave rise to the 
fire courts. The legislation for London established a unique 
standard—available in neither law nor equity—that shared loss 
proportionally.158 Every fire-court statute, after reciting the defi-
ciencies of ordinary procedure in aiding expeditious rebuilding,159 
authorized the fire courts to adopt summary, streamlined proce-
dures unlike anything available in traditional courts, then or 
since.160 The remedies that Parliament authorized were also un-
available in ordinary litigation. Forgiving arrears and overlook-
ing covenants to repair were not remedies within the ambit of the 
common-law courts; and while equity may have enjoyed the ca-
pacity to do both, neither equity nor common law could have 
taken the next step necessary to rebuild the towns: ordering the 
parties to accept longer leases on different terms from those orig-
inally negotiated.161 Rather than tailoring the remedy to the par-
ties’ legal rights, which is the standard remedial approach in law 
 
 158 See note 87 and accompanying text. See also note 128 (discussing comparable 
grants to the Southwark Fire Court). 
 159 See, for example, 18 & 19 Car II, c 7, § 1 (1667), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 601, 
601 (stating that tenants affected by the London Fire would likely be “lyeable unto Suites 
and Actions to compell them to repaire and rebuild,” that the tenants “are not releiveable 
therein in any ordinary course of Law,” and that legal disputes “if they should not be de-
termined with all speede and without charge would much obstruct the rebuilding of the 
said Citty”); 48 Geo III, ch 89, § 1 (1808) (on file with author) (stating that “divers Suits 
and Controversies are likely to arise between the Proprietors of and Persons interested in 
Houses and Lands [in Chudleigh], tending (if not prevented) to their great Vexation and 
Damage, and hindering the rebuilding of [Chudleigh]”). 
 160 See notes 93–100 and accompanying text. 
 161 See note 75 and accompanying text. 
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and equity,162 Parliament ordered the fire courts to tailor their rem-
edies to the social objective of rebuilding devastated communities.163 
Finally, history shows that the fire-court judges did not have 
license on their own to suspend the use of juries: Parliament del-
egated to the judges the discretion to do so.164 This discretion was 
confined to the adjudication of landlord-tenant disputes.165 The 
judges obeyed the terms of this delegation precisely; when re-
quired by statute to refer certain matters for jury trial, they fol-
lowed Parliament’s command without hesitation.166 We do not 
know the reason that they generally failed to employ juries, but 
it seems likely that they saw juries as an impediment to the op-
eration of the fire-court scheme. Uniformity in outcome among 
similarly situated landlords and tenants was critical to speedy re-
building;167 in London many cases settled or were mediated 
against the backdrop of the Fire Court’s decisions,168 and the 
prospect of the jury trial might otherwise have led some optimis-
tic parties to hold out. Impaneling juries in view of the mass dis-
persion of London residents after the Great Fire would also have 
presented significant logistical problems, and would have bur-
dened returning citizens who were eligible for jury service with 
 
 162 See Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 14–15, 265 
(Aspen 4th ed 2010) (stating that the purpose of remedial law is to restore the plaintiff to 
the position she would have been in but for the wrong). 
 163 In this sense, the fire courts adopted an approach to remedies that sometimes goes 
under the name of “do good” relief, which attempts to improve society according to a gen-
eral notion of fairness rather than one of legal entitlement. See id at 307. See also Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev 1281, 1293, 1302 
(1976) (describing how, in public law litigation, “right and remedy are pretty thoroughly 
disconnected,” so that “[r]elief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form 
logically derived from the substantive liability . . . ; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned 
ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for 
many persons”). 
 164 See note 101 and accompanying text. 
 165 In particular, Parliament required the later fire courts to use juries to establish 
the value of property taken by the courts for public or rebuilding purposes. For the Great 
Fire, the Court of Aldermen, rather than the Fire Court, had responsibility for this task. 
See note 121 and accompanying text. 
 166 See notes 104–05, 128–31, and accompanying text. 
 167 Indeed, shortly after the London Fire Court was established, a lawyer wrote a text 
designed, in part, to help landlords and tenants determine the value of property and leases 
in the wake of the Great Fire. In his dedication of the book to the Fire Court judges, the 
author stated his hope that the book would help parties to adjust differences in valuation 
between themselves without resorting to the Fire Court, thus aiding “the Speedy Rebuild-
ing” of London. See Stephen Primatt, The City & Country: Purchaser & Builder A2–A3 
(London 1903) (originally published 1667). 
 168 See note 90 and accompanying text. 
 2016] The English Fire Courts 1933 
 
public duties that would have distracted them from the task of 
rebuilding their own fortunes. 
While the third and fourth factors remain close to the histor-
ical circumstances of the fire courts, they also rely on structural 
and precedential insights. Structurally, the requirement that 
Congress erect a unique statutory regime, one feature of which is 
the delegation of the power to suspend jury trial to judges, en-
sures that all three branches of government (Congress and the 
president through the requirements of bicameralism and present-
ment and the judiciary in its exercise of delegated discretion) 
agree on the necessity of suspending jury trial. In terms of prece-
dent, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the remedy 
sought” is a critical determinant in the right to jury trial;169 re-
quiring that the statutory regime be constructed to induce socially 
beneficial behavior that existing law frustrates aligns such legis-
lation with the historical range of equity, which tended to act only 
when existing legal remedies were inadequate and which tended 
to award injunctive relief that induced future lawful behavior.170 
The third and fourth factors also nod in the direction of the 
Court’s more recently developed “public rights” limitation on the 
right to jury trial, which authorizes delegation of fact-finding to 
nonjury tribunals as a component of a “public regulatory 
scheme,”171 but only when “jury trials would impair the function-
ing of the legislative scheme.”172 
B. Applying the Abrogation Power in Modern Times 
These four factors provide a narrow path to suspension of the 
right to civil jury trial in federal court. Although some courts and 
commentators have argued for a broad judicial power to strike 
 
 169 See Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565, quoting Tull v United States, 481 US 412, 417 
(1987) (stating that “‘the remedy sought’ . . . is the more important [inquiry] in our analysis”). 
 170 See Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg concurring), 
quoting Mertens v Hewitt Associates, 508 US 248, 256 (1993) (stating that “those categories 
of relief that were typically available in equity . . . [included] injunction, mandamus, and 
restitution, but not compensatory damages”); Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 380 
(cited in note 162) (“It is hornbook law that equity will not act if there is an adequate 
remedy at law.”); id at 265 (“The injunction is a preventive remedy, because it seeks to 
prevent harm.”). 
 171 Thomas, 473 US at 594. 
 172 See Granfinanciera, 492 US at 42 n 4, 54; text accompanying note 139. Indeed, 
Congress could almost certainly authorize nonjury administrative adjudication in circum-
stances that meet the four factors outlined in the text. Thus, the principal effect of this 
narrow exception to the right to civil jury trial is to provide Congress with the option of 
investing federal judges, rather than agencies, with fact-finding authority. 
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juries in complex litigation,173 fidelity to the historical record sug-
gests greater caution. A multimillion dollar securities-fraud 
suit174 stumbles on the first factor: in view of the size of our econ-
omy, a single company’s alleged fraud does not present a national 
crisis. A massive antitrust dispute in a sensitive and economically 
vital industry175 arguably might clear the first factor, but it would 
trip over the remaining factors: antitrust law and procedure do 
not themselves impose an obstacle to the activity necessary to over-
come the crisis, nor has Congress established a unique regulatory 
scheme to spur activity necessary to overcome the arguable crisis 
or delegated to judges the decision whether jury trial would be 
incompatible with this scheme. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine cases that might fit 
within these four parameters. Recent disasters analogous to the 
Great Fire of London are the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010, the destruction of sections of New Orleans in Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, and al Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center 
on September 11, 2001. A different example is the mortgage fore-
closure crisis that exploded in 2008. Each event spurred substan-
tial litigation.176 Of course, for none of these disasters did Con-
gress create a special court analogous to the London Fire Court, 
 
 173 See notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 174 See, for example, In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F Supp 99, 103, 
105 (WD Wash 1976) (striking a jury demand in a securities fraud case that had already 
resulted in $50 million in settlements). 
 175 See, for example, In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F2d 
1069, 1074, 1079–89 (3d Cir 1980) (affirming the district court’s refusal to strike a jury 
under the Seventh Amendment in a case alleging a massive antitrust conspiracy among 
leading foreign manufacturers of electronics, but holding that the Due Process Clause may 
require a court to strike a jury “when a jury will not be able to perform its task of rational 
decisionmaking with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal 
standards”). 
 176 The September 11th attack generated significant litigation among the airlines, the 
developer of the World Trade Center, victims of the attack, and those who suffered injuries 
in responding to the attack. See generally In re September 11 Litigation, 751 F3d 86 (2d 
Cir 2014); In re September 11 Property Damage Litigation, 650 F3d 145 (2d Cir 2011); In 
re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation, 66 F Supp 3d 477 (SDNY 
2015); In re September 11th Litigation, 590 F Supp 2d 535 (SDNY 2008). For a small slice 
of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, see In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Lia-
bility Litigation (Louisiana Plaintiffs), 713 F3d 807, 810–11 (5th Cir 2013) (holding that 
the government was immune from damages resulting from temporary housing that it pro-
vided to victims); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F3d 436, 444–48 (5th Cir 
2012) (finding that the United States was immune from suit when damage had resulted 
from waters released by flood-control activity); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 
628 F3d 185, 189 (5th Cir 2010) (reversing the certification of a class action for victims of 
Hurricane Katrina). On the BP oil spill, see, for example, In re Deepwater Horizon, 772 
F3d 350, 353 (5th Cir 2014) (holding that entry of partial summary judgment against the 
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and it certainly never granted federal judges the discretion to 
strike a jury. But it is easy to imagine legislation that could have 
done so. 
To use the September 11th attack as an example, Congress 
created exclusive jurisdiction and venue in one federal court (the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York) for all legal claims arising from the attack; it also created a 
compensation fund to induce victims not to sue.177 This legislation 
applied ordinary rules of substantive, procedural, and remedial 
law to the claims filed in court,178 and it did not give judges of the 
Southern District the discretion to strike juries. Assume, however, 
that Congress had given these judges the ability to order the air-
lines to compensate victims based not on the airlines’ legal fault 
but rather “based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the 
claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant.”179 Fur-
ther assume that Congress authorized the judges of the Southern 
District to strike juries if they might interfere with the admin-
istration of this scheme. Such hypothetical legislation has many 
elements of the legislation creating the London Fire Court: a sig-
nificant political, social, and economic catastrophe; changes in the 
substantive rules of liability; and procedural and remedial law 
uniquely crafted to resolve the consequences of the catastrophe. 
Despite these similarities, this statute would not pass muster 
under a test derived from the history of the fire courts. Lacking is 
 
owners of a leaking well did not violate their Seventh Amendment rights); In re Deepwater 
Horizon, 744 F3d 370, 374–78 (5th Cir 2014) (affirming the district court’s interpretation 
of the parties’ settlement agreement, which permitted compensation on a broader basis 
than the defendant believed proper). The mortgage-crisis litigation was spread across the 
entire nation, and included both thousands upon thousands of individual foreclosure cases 
as well as litigation against major institutional players whose actions allegedly precipitated 
the crisis. See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Se-
curitized Housing Market, 34 Cardozo L Rev 1889, 1903–08 (2013) (describing the breadth 
of the foreclosure crisis); Matthew Goldstein, Bank of America to Pay $6.3 Billion to Settle 
Mortgage Securities Suit (NY Times, Mar 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F748 
-CGKT (describing a $6.3 billion settlement against Bank of America for its role in selling 
mortgage-backed securities). 
 177 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub L No 107-42, 115 
Stat 230 (2001). 
 178 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat at 241:  
The substantive law for decision in any such suit [seeking damages against air-
lines as a result of the September 11th crashes] shall be derived from the law, 
including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless 
such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law. 
 179 This direction was given to the special master who ran the September 11th Com-
pensation Fund. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
115 Stat at 238. 
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the critical element that drove the establishment of the fire courts: 
the sense that existing law imposed obstacles that frustrated ac-
tivities necessary to alleviate the crisis. True, after September 
11th the financial health of the airline industry was threatened 
as a result of lost aircraft and declining passenger revenue.180 But 
existing law was not itself the obstacle that kept passengers from 
flying. Nor was the portion of the statute providing compensation 
to victims designed to create incentives for passengers to fly 
(thereby reviving the industry); its sole purpose was compensa-
tion.181 If we assume that liability from existing and potential law-
suits was itself threatening the financial health of the airline in-
dustry, then legislation permitting judges to decide September 
11th lawsuits on a “loss apportioned among the parties” stand-
ard—under which judges could set damages with an eye toward 
avoiding crushing liability—would fit within the parameters of 
the fire-court legislation. There would be a crisis (the potential 
collapse of the airline industry), and existing law would impose 
an obstacle (massive liability) that made resolution of the crisis 
difficult. Creating tailored law that allocated losses between vic-
tims and the airlines would encourage prospective activity (keep-
ing the airlines operational) to alleviate the crisis, and the varia-
bility of jury trial would frustrate awards of damages calibrated 
to ensure the airlines’ financial health. 
A less far-fetched example arises from the recent mortgage 
foreclosure crisis, which parallels the problems of urban fires in 
many ways. The collapse of the housing market in 2008 created 
an economic crisis. Existing law, which required home owners to 
make agreed-on payments and gave lenders the right to foreclose 
for nonpayment, created an obstacle to the activity necessary to 
overcome the crisis: continued payment of mortgages on an ex-
tended and reduced basis that reflected income levels and prop-
erty values. Legislation that would have given a “mortgage court” 
the ability to forgive arrears and adjust mortgage payments in 
light of income and value would have altered the traditional legal 
rights of home owners and lenders, and would have done so in a 
way that encouraged prospective activity (continuing payments on 
 
 180 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 101(a)(2), 115 Stat 
at 230. 
 181 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 403, 115 Stat at 237 (“It 
is the purpose of this title to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a 
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”). 
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loans and continued home occupation) that might overcome the 
crisis.182 If Congress allowed this hypothetical “mortgage court” to 
suspend jury trial for the monetary claims of lenders whenever 
the prospective variability of jury trial might threaten the uni-
formity of result necessary to induce home owners and lenders to 
settle in the shadow of the court’s justice,183 then the analogy to 
the fire courts would be complete. 
In recent years, scholars have noted the trend toward agency 
or executive-branch settlement or adjudication of broad social dis-
putes, many of which contain both backward-looking (compensa-
tory) and forward-looking (injunctive) elements.184 Although ad-
ministrative or executive resolution of such disputes holds the 
promise of swift, inexpensive, and consistent justice, the practice 
also creates substantial concerns about capture, loyalty, and ac-
curacy.185 A common theme that has emerged in this literature is 
to import into these administrative or executive-branch solutions 
some of the protections that litigants receive in court; but doing 
so is not without problems—including sticky separation-of-powers 
issues that surround attempts by Congress or the judiciary to reg-
ulate the actions of the executive when it refuses to adopt these 
protections voluntarily.186 
An evident solution is to return these disputes to the courts, 
which already have in place numerous protections for individuals 
 
 182 In the wake of the 2008 mortgage foreclosure crisis, Congress and the president 
responded with legislation and executive actions that made it easier for home owners to 
secure refinancing or modification of existing mortgages based on property values and in-
come levels. See, for example, Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act § 1482, 
Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 2136, 2203 (2010), codified at 12 USC § 5219a (authorizing 
the secretary of the treasury to enact Home Affordable Modification Program guidelines); 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 110, Pub L No 110-343, 122 Stat 3765, 
3775, codified at 12 USC § 5220 (requiring federal agencies that hold mortgages to assist 
home owners); Nussbaum, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1909–12 (cited in note 176) (discussing 
federal programs that permitted home owners to refinance or modify mortgages). 
 183 Express congressional delegation of this power is required. Congress often fails to 
state whether jury trial is available, thus leaving courts to determine the question under 
the Seventh Amendment. See Tull, 481 US at 425 (noting that the statute in question “did 
not explicitly state whether juries or trial judges were to fix the civil penalties”); Lehman 
v Nakshian, 453 US 156, 162 (1981) (stating that Congress “failed explicitly to” provide 
for jury trial in the relevant statute). Congressional silence would be insufficient to trigger 
a federal court’s capacity to suspend jury trial. 
 184 See, for example, Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio and Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency 
Class Action, 112 Colum L Rev 1992, 2002–07 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Lit-
igation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 Harv L Rev 486, 
492–510 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, 163 U Pa L Rev 1393, 
1403–07, 1421–35 (2015). 
 185 See Zimmerman, 163 U Pa L Rev at 1442–52 (cited in note 184). 
 186 Id at 1453–61; Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev at 542–46 (cited in note 184). 
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caught up in large-scale catastrophes. It is often thought that jury 
trial stands in the way of this solution: parties often balk at the 
notion that twelve people “good and true” should determine the 
fate of an industry, and juries make more difficult the use of novel 
techniques to bifurcate or segment cases.187 Congress’s power to 
give judges the discretion to abrogate jury trial creates another 
option to resolve at least some of these large-scale disputes. Of 
course, many considerations will ultimately bear on the choice of 
forum, but the constraints imposed by jury trial do not always 
need to be among them. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of the fire courts supports a narrow exception to 
the right to a civil jury in federal court. To be faithful to this his-
tory, the exception requires that Congress design a legal regime 
removing obstacles that existing legal rules place in the way of an 
activity necessary for recovery from a crisis; in addition, any valid 
suspension of jury trial also requires Congress to delegate the 
power to Article III judges to suspend jury trial only if jury trial 
would threaten the effectiveness of the regulatory regime. Not 
every disaster fits within these parameters, and Congress must 
thread the needle carefully for those disasters that do. 
Even if history gives Congress the license to suspend the 
right to civil jury trial in unique circumstances, the issue remains 
whether history should change the settled interpretation of the 
Seventh Amendment. Knowledge of the fire courts has been lost 
to time,188 and the modern understanding of the scope of jury trial 
 
 187 For a general discussion of these concerns in the context of a class action, see In 
the Matter of Rhone–Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298–304 (7th Cir 1995). 
 188 There are only two substantive mentions of the fire courts in American law re-
views—one in 1891 and one in 2012—and both were brief. See Marc L. Roark, Disease, 
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See Erik Stock, Note, “We Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It”: Adopting 
a Transformative Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 Ohio St J Disp Res 687, 692 
n 36 (2008) (mentioning a surveyor, Robert Hooke, whose postfire surveys were used by 
 2016] The English Fire Courts 1939 
 
has formed in ignorance of the fire courts’ existence. In this regard, 
the fire courts raise an issue of more general significance to con-
stitutional interpretation and construction. Knowledge of history 
will always be imperfect. Albeit infrequently, unexpected histor-
ical revelations may fundamentally alter our understanding of 
the meaning of a constitutional text. The question is to determine 
the better course: stick with the settled meaning of a text or con-
form the Constitution more closely to the fuller understanding 
that the historical record provides.189 The issue is most salient for 
those who adhere to originalist methodologies of constitutional 
interpretation and construction, but it matters for any methodol-
ogy that gives credence to history—as virtually all methods do.190 
Whatever the answer in other constitutional contexts, the an-
swer under the Seventh Amendment is clear: the history of the 
fire courts must be incorporated into our understanding of the 
right to a civil jury. Unlike other constitutional texts, the Seventh 
Amendment bakes the importance of history into its very words 
(“the right of trial by jury shall be preserved”).191 Unlike other con-
stitutional texts, the Amendment has generated broad agreement 
across time and across ideological and methodological spectrums 
that history matters in the Amendment’s interpretation and con-
struction.192 Unlike the use of history in other constitutional 
contexts, the historical issue in the Seventh Amendment context 
does not require a value-laden construction of the Framers’ intent 
or the original public meaning of a text.193 Uniquely among consti-
tutional provisions, the Seventh Amendment requires an inquiry 
into objective historical fact—English practice in 1791—rather than 
subjective intent or meaning. 
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Therefore, the history of eighteenth-century English practice 
must bear on the shape of the modern right to civil jury trial in 
federal court. One aspect of English practice in 1791 was the sys-
tem of fire courts—ad hoc tribunals created by Parliament to re-
spond to urban crises and given discretion to resolve disputes 
without the aid of juries. In a comparable modern crisis, history 
tells us that Congress and federal judges should have comparable 
powers. 
Of course, history is only one factor affecting the scope of the 
Seventh Amendment.194 But a limited power to suspend the right 
to jury trial in crises comparable to those that gave rise to the fire 
courts is consistent not only with history but also with the non-
historical factors—“the nature of the relief sought” and “public 
rights” litigation—that the Supreme Court uses to shape the 
Seventh Amendment.195 Present-day situations equivalent to 
those that led to the fire courts—situations in which existing legal 
remedies are inadequate to spur the activity necessary to over-
come a crisis—are equivalent to the circumstances in which eq-
uity traditionally intervened. Thus, suspending the right to a civil 
jury during certain crises fits nicely within the Amendment’s an-
alytical framework. 
This conclusion does not require acceptance of the broad 
claim that the Seventh Amendment contains a “complexity excep-
tion” under which federal courts may suspend civil jury trial when 
cases are too complicated for ordinary citizens to understand.196 
Debate over the existence of this “exception” has raged for 
years.197 The exception is on shaky ground for a number of rea-
sons,198 not the least of which is the lack of clear historical ante-
cedents. Although fire-court lawsuits contained one element of 
modern complex litigation—a mass number of claims199—a care-
ful, cautious, and faithful reading of the fire-court history does 
not permit its extrapolation to all complex cases. 
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Nor does this conclusion require acceptance of the general 
claim that emergencies reshape the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.200 The fire courts show that the right to a civil jury had been 
subject to suspension in a time of crisis long before the ratification 
of the Seventh Amendment. In the circumstances that this Article 
has described, suspension of civil jury trial during a crisis was 
built into the right from the beginning. 
As limited as the power is, the idea that Congress has any 
power to suspend the right to civil jury trial in federal court none-
theless sounds novel and radical. One of the standard arguments 
made for originalism is the damper that its historical method 
places on novel (and presumably undesirable) constitutional inter-
pretations and constructions.201 This argument assumes that the 
history of every constitutional provision is fully known. Occasion-
ally, however, history holds a surprise. That is perhaps the ulti-
mate lesson of the fire courts. History can sometimes act as a de-
stabilizing force in constitutional interpretation and construction. 
 
 
 200 See Ackerman, 113 Yale L J at 1030–32 (cited in note 153) (arguing that national 
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 201 See Solum, Book Review, 91 Tex L Rev at 154–56 (cited in note 4) (arguing that a 
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